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Government bankruptcy of Balkan nations and the consequences for money and inflation before 1914: a comparative analysis

In: Constitutional Economics and Public Institutions

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  • Peter Bernholz

Abstract

This extensive book explores in detail a wide range of topics within the public choice and constitutional political economy tradition, providing a comprehensive overview of current work across the field.

Suggested Citation

  • Peter Bernholz, 2013. "Government bankruptcy of Balkan nations and the consequences for money and inflation before 1914: a comparative analysis," Chapters, in: Francisco Cabrillo & Miguel A. Puchades-Navarro (ed.), Constitutional Economics and Public Institutions, chapter 13, pages 236-254, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    • Handle: RePEc:elg:eechap:14863_13
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Peter Bernholz, 2003. "Monetary Regimes and Inflation," Books, Edward Elgar Publishing, number 2873.
    2. Thomas J. Sargent & Neil Wallace, 1984. "Some Unpleasant Monetarist Arithmetic," Palgrave Macmillan Books, in: Brian Griffiths & Geoffrey E. Wood (ed.), Monetarism in the United Kingdom, pages 15-41, Palgrave Macmillan.
    3. Lazaretou Sophia, 1995. "Government Spending, Monetary Policies, and Exchange Rate Regime Switches: The Drachma in the Gold Standard Period," Explorations in Economic History, Elsevier, vol. 32(1), pages 28-50, January.
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