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Involuntary transaction of property through taking and regulatory taking

In: The Economic Analysis of Civil Law

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Abstract

Taking is a coercive state instrument, for purposes of protecting the public interest. In a constitutional context, taking is directed at the complete or partial deprivation of property against compensation, which in most but not all legal systems is protected as a basic constitutional right. An obligation to pay compensation might also be triggered if property is unlawfully encroached upon by measures of the public authorities. If a regulatory norm does not lead to a transfer of property but to a loss of property value (regulatory taking), this leads to compensation only in specific cases. The chapter concentrates on the question how the rules of taking law can achieve that the taking decision is actually in the public interest.

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  • ., 2022. "Involuntary transaction of property through taking and regulatory taking," Chapters, in: The Economic Analysis of Civil Law, chapter 20, pages 511-524, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    • Handle: RePEc:elg:eechap:14501_20
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    Economics and Finance; Law - Academic;

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