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Regulator Incentives and Third Generation National Mobile Telecommunications Market Entry

In: Regulation and the Performance of Communication and Information Networks

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  • Gary Madden
  • Aaron Morey
  • Erik Bohlin

Abstract

Digital markets worldwide are in rapid flux. The Internet and World Wide Web have traditionally evolved in a largely deregulated environment, but recently governments have shown great interest in this rapidly developing sector and are imposing regulations for a variety of reasons that are changing the shape of these industries. This book explores why the industrial organization of broadband ISPs, Internet backbone providers and content/application providers are in such turmoil.

Suggested Citation

  • Gary Madden & Aaron Morey & Erik Bohlin, 2012. "Regulator Incentives and Third Generation National Mobile Telecommunications Market Entry," Chapters, in: Gerald R. Faulhaber & Gary Madden & Jeffrey Petchey (ed.), Regulation and the Performance of Communication and Information Networks, chapter 11, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    • Handle: RePEc:elg:eechap:14325_11
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Azacis, Helmuts & Burguet, Roberto, 2008. "Incumbency and entry in license auctions: The Anglo-Dutch auction meets another simple alternative," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 26(3), pages 730-745, May.
    2. Gruber,Harald, 2005. "The Economics of Mobile Telecommunications," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521843270, October.
    3. Gary Madden & Russel Cooper (ed.), 2009. "The Economics of Digital Markets," Books, Edward Elgar Publishing, number 13031.
    4. Klemperer, Paul, 2002. "How (not) to run auctions: The European 3G telecom auctions," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 46(4-5), pages 829-845, May.
    5. Noam, Eli, 1998. "Spectrum Auctions: Yesterday's Heresy, Today's Orthodoxy, Tomorrow's Anachronism. Taking the Next Step to Open Spectrum Access," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 41(2), pages 765-790, October.
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    7. L. Cartelier, 2003. "Auctions Versus Beauty Contests: The Allocation of UMTS Licences in Europe," Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 74(1), pages 63-85, March.
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