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California’s State and Local Revenue Structure After Proposition 13: Is Denial the Appropriate Way to Cope?

In: State and Local Fiscal Policy

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  • Robert W Wassmer

Abstract

In this broad and illuminating work, experts on public finance discuss innovations in state and local tax policy that have been implemented or considered over the course of the last three decades. The authors provide original work that analyzes whether state and local governments have ‘gone outside the box’ to deal with the strains of current public finances or have gotten along by adhering to the status quo. This book provides researchers, students and policy makers with evaluations and analyses by well-known scholars in the area of state and local public finance of actual practices and analysis of potential policy changes for the future.

Suggested Citation

  • Robert W Wassmer, 2010. "California’s State and Local Revenue Structure After Proposition 13: Is Denial the Appropriate Way to Cope?," Chapters, in: Sally Wallace (ed.), State and Local Fiscal Policy, chapter 5, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    • Handle: RePEc:elg:eechap:13489_5
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Fischel, William A., 1989. "Did Serrano Cause Proposition 13?," National Tax Journal, National Tax Association, vol. 42(4), pages 465-73, December.
    2. Fischel, William A., 1989. "Did Serrano Cause Proposition 13?," National Tax Journal, National Tax Association;National Tax Journal, vol. 42(4), pages 465-473, December.
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