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Earth, Wind, and Fire! Federalism and Incentive in Natural Disaster Response

In: The Political Economy of Hurricane Katrina and Community Rebound

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  • Emily C. Schaeffer
  • Andrew Kashdan

Abstract

In 2005 Hurricane Katrina posed an unprecedented set of challenges to formal and informal systems of disaster response and recovery. Informed by the Virginia School of Political Economy, the contributors to this study critically examine the public policy environment that led to both successes and failures in the post-Katrina disaster response and long-term recovery. Building from this perspective, this book lends critical insight into the nature of the social coordination problems disasters present, the potential for public policy to play a positive role, and the inherent limitations policymakers face in overcoming the myriad challenges that are a product of catastrophic disaster.

Suggested Citation

  • Emily C. Schaeffer & Andrew Kashdan, 2010. "Earth, Wind, and Fire! Federalism and Incentive in Natural Disaster Response," Chapters, in: Emily Chamlee-Wright & Virgil Henry Storr (ed.), The Political Economy of Hurricane Katrina and Community Rebound, chapter 10, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    • Handle: RePEc:elg:eechap:13375_10
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    9. Peter Boettke & Emily Chamlee-Wright & Peter Gordon & Sanford Ikeda & Peter T. Leeson & Russell Sobel, 2007. "The Political, Economic, and Social Aspects of Katrina," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 74(2), pages 363-376, October.
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