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Weijie Zhong

Personal Details

First Name:Weijie
Middle Name:
Last Name:Zhong
Suffix:
RePEc Short-ID:pzh624
[This author has chosen not to make the email address public]

Affiliation

Department of Economics
School of Arts and Sciences
Columbia University

New York City, New York (United States)
http://www.columbia.edu/cu/economics/
RePEc:edi:declbus (more details at EDIRC)

Research output

as
Jump to: Working papers Articles

Working papers

  1. Andrew Koh & Sivakorn Sanguanmoo & Weijie Zhong, 2024. "Persuasion and Optimal Stopping," Papers 2406.12278, arXiv.org, revised Aug 2024.
  2. Wei He & Jiangtao Li & Weijie Zhong, 2024. "Rank-Guaranteed Auctions," Papers 2408.12001, arXiv.org.
  3. Navin Kartik & Weijie Zhong, 2023. "Lemonade from Lemons: Information Design and Adverse Selection," Papers 2305.02994, arXiv.org.
  4. Benjamin H'ebert & Weijie Zhong, 2022. "Engagement Maximization," Papers 2207.00685, arXiv.org, revised Sep 2024.
  5. Yeon-Koo Che & Weijie Zhong, 2021. "Robustly Optimal Mechanisms for Selling Multiple Goods," Papers 2105.02828, arXiv.org, revised Aug 2024.
  6. Yeon-Koo Che & Kyungmin Kim & Weijie Zhong, 2020. "Statistical Discrimination in Ratings-Guided Markets," Papers 2004.11531, arXiv.org, revised Nov 2024.
  7. Daniel Chen & Weijie Zhong, 2018. "Information Acquisition and Time-Risk Preference," Papers 1809.05120, arXiv.org, revised Aug 2024.
  8. Weijie Zhong, 2018. "Selling Information," Papers 1809.06770, arXiv.org, revised Oct 2018.
  9. Weijie Zhong, 2018. "The Indirect Cost of Information," Papers 1809.00697, arXiv.org, revised Apr 2020.
  10. Qingmin Liu & Konrad Mierendorff & Xianwen Shi & Weijie Zhong, 2018. "Auctions with Limited Commitment," Working Papers tecipa-617, University of Toronto, Department of Economics.

Articles

  1. Weijie Zhong, 2022. "Optimal Dynamic Information Acquisition," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 90(4), pages 1537-1582, July.
  2. Qingmin Liu & Konrad Mierendorff & Xianwen Shi & Weijie Zhong, 2019. "Auctions with Limited Commitment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 109(3), pages 876-910, March.

Citations

Many of the citations below have been collected in an experimental project, CitEc, where a more detailed citation analysis can be found. These are citations from works listed in RePEc that could be analyzed mechanically. So far, only a minority of all works could be analyzed. See under "Corrections" how you can help improve the citation analysis.

Working papers

  1. Navin Kartik & Weijie Zhong, 2023. "Lemonade from Lemons: Information Design and Adverse Selection," Papers 2305.02994, arXiv.org.

    Cited by:

    1. Dirk Bergemann & Benjamin Brooks & Stephen Morris, 2024. "On the Alignment of Consumer Surplus and Total Surplus Under Competitive Price Discrimination," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 2373R1, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
    2. Martin Pollrich & Roland Strausz, 2024. "The Irrelevance of Fee Structures for Certification," American Economic Review: Insights, American Economic Association, vol. 6(1), pages 55-72, March.
    3. Maarten C.W. Janssen & Santanu Roy, 2023. "Information Uncertainty," Departmental Working Papers 2306, Southern Methodist University, Department of Economics.

  2. Yeon-Koo Che & Weijie Zhong, 2021. "Robustly Optimal Mechanisms for Selling Multiple Goods," Papers 2105.02828, arXiv.org, revised Aug 2024.

    Cited by:

    1. Jerry Anunrojwong & Santiago R. Balseiro & Omar Besbes, 2022. "On the Robustness of Second-Price Auctions in Prior-Independent Mechanism Design," Papers 2204.10478, arXiv.org, revised Dec 2024.

  3. Yeon-Koo Che & Kyungmin Kim & Weijie Zhong, 2020. "Statistical Discrimination in Ratings-Guided Markets," Papers 2004.11531, arXiv.org, revised Nov 2024.

    Cited by:

    1. Federico Echenique & Anqi Li, 2022. "Rationally Inattentive Statistical Discrimination: Arrow Meets Phelps," Papers 2212.08219, arXiv.org, revised Sep 2024.
    2. Lepage, Louis Pierre, 2021. "Endogenous learning, persistent employer biases, and discrimination," CLEF Working Paper Series 34, Canadian Labour Economics Forum (CLEF), University of Waterloo.

  4. Qingmin Liu & Konrad Mierendorff & Xianwen Shi & Weijie Zhong, 2018. "Auctions with Limited Commitment," Working Papers tecipa-617, University of Toronto, Department of Economics.

    Cited by:

    1. Fugger, Nicolas & Gretschko, Vitali & Pollrich, Martin, 2022. "Information design in sequential procurement," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 135(C), pages 79-85.
    2. Ahrash Dianat & Mikhail Freer, 2021. "Credibility in Second-Price Auctions: An Experimental Test," Papers 2105.00204, arXiv.org, revised Jan 2023.
    3. Andrew Koh & Sivakorn Sanguanmoo & Kei Uzui, 2024. "Informational Puts," Papers 2411.09191, arXiv.org, revised Dec 2024.
    4. Stephan Lauermann & Asher Wolinsky, 2024. "Auctions with Frictions: Recruitment, Entry, and Limited Commitment," ECONtribute Discussion Papers Series 288, University of Bonn and University of Cologne, Germany.
    5. Laura Doval & Vasiliki Skreta, 2019. "Optimal mechanism for the sale of a durable good," Papers 1904.07456, arXiv.org, revised May 2021.
    6. Laura Doval & Vasiliki Skreta, 2018. "Mechanism Design with Limited Commitment," Papers 1811.03579, arXiv.org, revised Dec 2021.
    7. Ekmekci, Mehmet & Maestri, Lucas, 2022. "Wait or act now? Learning dynamics in stopping games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 205(C).
    8. Meryem Essaidi & Matheus V. X. Ferreira & S. Matthew Weinberg, 2022. "Credible, Strategyproof, Optimal, and Bounded Expected-Round Single-Item Auctions for all Distributions," Papers 2205.14758, arXiv.org.
    9. Martino Banchio & Frank Yang, 2021. "Dynamic Pricing with Limited Commitment," Papers 2102.07742, arXiv.org, revised Dec 2021.
    10. Santiago R. Balseiro & Omar Besbes & Gabriel Y. Weintraub, 2019. "Dynamic Mechanism Design with Budget-Constrained Buyers Under Limited Commitment," Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 67(3), pages 711-730, May.
    11. Fugger, Nicolas & Gretschko, Vitali & Pollrich, Martin, 2019. "Sequential procurement with limited commitment," ZEW Discussion Papers 19-030, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research.
    12. Stephan Lauermann & Asher Wolinsky, 2024. "Auctions with Frictions: Recruitment, Entry, and Limited Commitment," CRC TR 224 Discussion Paper Series crctr224_2024_519, University of Bonn and University of Mannheim, Germany.
    13. Matheus V. X. Ferreira & S. Matthew Weinberg, 2020. "Credible, Truthful, and Two-Round (Optimal) Auctions via Cryptographic Commitments," Papers 2004.01598, arXiv.org, revised May 2020.
    14. Gretschko, Vitali & Pollrich, Martin, 2019. "Incomplete contracts in dynamic procurement," ZEW Discussion Papers 19-040, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research.
    15. Vitali Gretschko & Martin Pollrich, 2022. "Incomplete Contracts in Multi-period Procurement," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 68(7), pages 5146-5161, July.
    16. He, Wei & Li, Jiangtao, 2022. "Correlation-robust auction design," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 200(C).
    17. Chang, Dongkyu & Lee, Jong Jae, 2022. "Price skimming: Commitment and delay in bargaining with outside option," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 205(C).
    18. Patrick Hummel, 2018. "Reserve prices in repeated auctions," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 47(1), pages 273-299, March.
    19. Kirkegaard, René, 2022. "Efficiency in asymmetric auctions with endogenous reserve prices," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 132(C), pages 234-239.

Articles

  1. Weijie Zhong, 2022. "Optimal Dynamic Information Acquisition," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 90(4), pages 1537-1582, July.

    Cited by:

    1. Ekström, Erik & Milazzo, Alessandro, 2024. "A detection problem with a monotone observation rate," Stochastic Processes and their Applications, Elsevier, vol. 172(C).
    2. Benjamin M. Hébert & Michael Woodford, 2019. "Rational Inattention when Decisions Take Time," NBER Working Papers 26415, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    3. Li, Anqi & Hu, Lin, 2023. "Electoral accountability and selection with personalized information aggregation," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 140(C), pages 296-315.

  2. Qingmin Liu & Konrad Mierendorff & Xianwen Shi & Weijie Zhong, 2019. "Auctions with Limited Commitment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 109(3), pages 876-910, March.
    See citations under working paper version above.

More information

Research fields, statistics, top rankings, if available.

Statistics

Access and download statistics for all items

NEP Fields

NEP is an announcement service for new working papers, with a weekly report in each of many fields. This author has had 11 papers announced in NEP. These are the fields, ordered by number of announcements, along with their dates. If the author is listed in the directory of specialists for this field, a link is also provided.
  1. NEP-MIC: Microeconomics (10) 2018-09-10 2018-10-01 2018-10-01 2020-05-11 2021-05-10 2022-08-22 2022-09-12 2023-06-19 2024-08-12 2024-09-30. Author is listed
  2. NEP-DES: Economic Design (4) 2018-09-10 2023-06-19 2024-08-12 2024-09-30. Author is listed
  3. NEP-COM: Industrial Competition (2) 2021-05-10 2023-06-19
  4. NEP-GTH: Game Theory (2) 2018-09-10 2024-08-12
  5. NEP-CTA: Contract Theory and Applications (1) 2023-06-19
  6. NEP-DGE: Dynamic General Equilibrium (1) 2018-10-01
  7. NEP-EXP: Experimental Economics (1) 2018-10-01
  8. NEP-GEN: Gender (1) 2020-05-11

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