Ran Shao
Personal Details
First Name: | Ran |
Middle Name: | |
Last Name: | Shao |
Suffix: | |
RePEc Short-ID: | psh489 |
| |
http://ranshao.wordpress.com/ | |
215 Lexington Room 715, New York, NY 10016 | |
Affiliation
Department of Economics
Yeshiva University
New York City, New York (United States)http://www.yu.edu/yeshiva-college/ug/economics/
RePEc:edi:deyesus (more details at EDIRC)
Research output
Jump to: ArticlesArticles
- Shao, Ran, 2016. "Generalized coarse matching," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 100(C), pages 142-148.
- Shao, Ran & Zhou, Lin, 2016. "Optimal allocation of an indivisible good," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 100(C), pages 95-112.
- Shao, Ran & Zhou, Lin, 2016. "Voting and optimal provision of a public good," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 134(C), pages 35-41.
- Ran Shao & Na Wang, 2015. "Effects of Aging on Gender Differences in Financial Markets," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 35(1), pages 834-840.
Citations
Many of the citations below have been collected in an experimental project, CitEc, where a more detailed citation analysis can be found. These are citations from works listed in RePEc that could be analyzed mechanically. So far, only a minority of all works could be analyzed. See under "Corrections" how you can help improve the citation analysis.Articles
- Shao, Ran & Zhou, Lin, 2016.
"Optimal allocation of an indivisible good,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 100(C), pages 95-112.
Cited by:
- Ranojoy Basu & Conan Mukherjee, 2024. "Characterization of maxmed mechanisms for multiple objects," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 28(2), pages 313-330, June.
- Conan Mukherjee, 2020. "On group strategyproof and optimal object allocation," Economic Theory Bulletin, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 8(2), pages 289-304, October.
- Moritz Drexl & Andreas Kleiner, 2018.
"Why Voting? A Welfare Analysis,"
American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 10(3), pages 253-271, August.
- Kleiner, Andreas & Drexl, Moritz, 2013. "Why Voting? A Welfare Analysis," VfS Annual Conference 2013 (Duesseldorf): Competition Policy and Regulation in a Global Economic Order 79886, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
- Kiho Yoon, 2021. "Robust double auction mechanisms," Papers 2102.00669, arXiv.org, revised May 2022.
- Debasis Mishra & Tridib Sharma, 2016.
"Balanced ranking mechanisms,"
Discussion Papers
16-04, Indian Statistical Institute, Delhi.
- Long, Yan & Mishra, Debasis & Sharma, Tridib, 2017. "Balanced ranking mechanisms," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 105(C), pages 9-39.
- Blumrosen, Liad & Dobzinski, Shahar, 2021. "(Almost) efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 130(C), pages 369-383.
- Shao, Ran & Zhou, Lin, 2016. "Voting and optimal provision of a public good," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 134(C), pages 35-41.
- Kiho Yoon, 2018. "Optimal robust allocation of private goods," Discussion Paper Series 1803, Institute of Economic Research, Korea University.
- Shao, Ran & Zhou, Lin, 2016.
"Voting and optimal provision of a public good,"
Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 134(C), pages 35-41.
Cited by:
- Moritz Drexl & Andreas Kleiner, 2018.
"Why Voting? A Welfare Analysis,"
American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 10(3), pages 253-271, August.
- Kleiner, Andreas & Drexl, Moritz, 2013. "Why Voting? A Welfare Analysis," VfS Annual Conference 2013 (Duesseldorf): Competition Policy and Regulation in a Global Economic Order 79886, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
- Hans Gersbach & Stephan Imhof & Oriol Tejada, 2021. "Channeling the final say in politics: a simple mechanism," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 71(1), pages 151-183, February.
- Moritz Drexl & Andreas Kleiner, 2018.
"Why Voting? A Welfare Analysis,"
American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 10(3), pages 253-271, August.
More information
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Corrections
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