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Sabitha Nagarajan

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First Name:Sabitha
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Last Name:Nagarajan
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RePEc Short-ID:pna422

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Jump to: Working papers Articles

Working papers

  1. S. Nagarajan & C. W. Sealey, 1997. "State-Contingent Bank Regulation," New York University, Leonard N. Stern School Finance Department Working Paper Seires 97-9, New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business-.
  2. S. Nagarajan, 1997. "Are Financial Corners and Short Squeezes Inefficient?," New York University, Leonard N. Stern School Finance Department Working Paper Seires 97-5, New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business-.
  3. S. Nagarajan & C. W. Sealey, 1997. "Can Delegating Bank Regulation to Market Forces Really Work?," New York University, Leonard N. Stern School Finance Department Working Paper Seires 97-8, New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business-.
  4. S. Nagarajan, 1997. "Design of Efficient Bankruptcy Mechanisms," New York University, Leonard N. Stern School Finance Department Working Paper Seires 97-7, New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business-.
  5. S. Nagarajan, 1997. "Efficient Security Design: Theory and Application," New York University, Leonard N. Stern School Finance Department Working Paper Seires 97-6, New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business-.
  6. Nagarajan, S. & Sealey, C.W., 1993. "Forbearance, Deposit Insurance Pricing, and Incentive Compatible Bank Regulation," Papers 93-05, Columbia - Graduate School of Business.
  7. Nagarajan, S., 1993. "Are Limited Liability Contracts Efficient? Theory and Application," Papers 93-06a, Columbia - Graduate School of Business.
  8. Nagarajan, S. & Ramakrishnan, R.T.S., 1992. "A Theory of Trading Intermediation Under Multilateral Asymmetric Information," Papers 93-02a, Columbia - Graduate School of Business.
  9. Fulghieri, P. & Nagarajan, S., 1992. "On the Strategic Role of High Leverage in Entry Deterrence," Papers 92-10, Columbia - Graduate School of Business.
  10. Nagarajan, S. & Ramakrishnan, R.T.S.J., 1992. "Efficient Trading System Design: Market Makers, Membership Fees,a nd Exchange Ownership Structure," Papers 92-05, Columbia - Graduate School of Business.
  11. Fulghieri, P. & Nagarajan, S., 1991. "Financial Contracts as Lasting Commitments: The Case of Leveraged Oligopoly," Papers 92-01, Columbia - Graduate School of Business.
  12. Nagarajan, S., 1988. "On The Efficiency Of Takeovers," Papers fb-_88-27, Columbia - Graduate School of Business.

Articles

  1. Tim Bunnell & S. Nagarajan & Andrew Willford, 2010. "From the Margins to Centre Stage: ‘Indian’ Demonstration Effects in Malaysia’s Political Landscape," Urban Studies, Urban Studies Journal Limited, vol. 47(6), pages 1257-1278, May.
  2. Nagarajan, S. & Sealey, C. W., 1998. "State-contingent regulatory mechanisms and fairly priced deposit insurance," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 22(9), pages 1139-1156, September.
  3. Fulghieri, P. & Nagarajan, S., 1996. "On the strategic role of high leverage in entry deterrence," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 20(1), pages 1-23, January.
  4. Nagarajan S., 1995. "On the Generic Efficiency of Takeovers under Incomplete Information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 65(2), pages 522-556, April.
  5. Nagarajan, S. & Sealey, C. W., 1995. "Forbearance, deposit insurance pricing, and incentive compatible bank regulation," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 19(6), pages 1109-1130, September.
  6. Fulghieri, Paolo & Nagarajan, S., 1992. "Financial contracts as lasting commitments: The case of a leveraged oligopoly," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 2(1), pages 2-32, March.

Citations

Many of the citations below have been collected in an experimental project, CitEc, where a more detailed citation analysis can be found. These are citations from works listed in RePEc that could be analyzed mechanically. So far, only a minority of all works could be analyzed. See under "Corrections" how you can help improve the citation analysis.

Working papers

  1. S. Nagarajan & C. W. Sealey, 1997. "Can Delegating Bank Regulation to Market Forces Really Work?," New York University, Leonard N. Stern School Finance Department Working Paper Seires 97-8, New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business-.

    Cited by:

    1. João A. C. Santos, 2000. "Bank capital regulation in contemporary banking theory: a review of the literature," BIS Working Papers 90, Bank for International Settlements.

  2. Nagarajan, S. & Sealey, C.W., 1993. "Forbearance, Deposit Insurance Pricing, and Incentive Compatible Bank Regulation," Papers 93-05, Columbia - Graduate School of Business.

    Cited by:

    1. International Monetary Fund, 2007. "Italy—Assessing Competition and Efficiency in the Banking System," IMF Working Papers 2007/026, International Monetary Fund.
    2. Kenneth Kasa & Mark M. Spiegel, 1999. "The role of relative performance in bank closure decisions," Working Papers in Applied Economic Theory 99-07, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco.
    3. J. C. Reboredo, 2004. "A note on efficiency and solvency in banking," Applied Economics Letters, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 11(3), pages 183-185.
    4. Guo, Lin, 1999. "When and why did FSLIC resolve insolvent thrifts?," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 23(6), pages 955-990, June.
    5. Arturo Bris & Salvatore Cantale, 1998. "Bank Capital Requirements and Managerial Self-Interest," Yale School of Management Working Papers ysm105, Yale School of Management, revised 01 Aug 2000.
    6. Carletti, Elena & Hartmann, Philipp, 2002. "Competition and stability: what's special about banking?," Working Paper Series 146, European Central Bank.
    7. Nagarajan, S. & Sealey, C. W., 1998. "State-contingent regulatory mechanisms and fairly priced deposit insurance," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 22(9), pages 1139-1156, September.
    8. Tomislav Galac, 2005. "Does Croatia Need Risk-Based Deposit Insurance Premia?," Surveys 10, The Croatian National Bank, Croatia.
    9. Bris, Arturo & Cantale, Salvatore, 2004. "Bank capital requirements and managerial self-interest," The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 44(1), pages 77-101, February.
    10. Hwei-Lin Chuang & Shih-Cheng Lee & Yi-Chun Lin & Min-Teh Yu, 2009. "Estimating the cost of deposit insurance with stochastic interest rates: the case of Taiwan," Quantitative Finance, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 9(1), pages 1-8.
    11. Skeie, David R., 2008. "Banking with nominal deposits and inside money," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 17(4), pages 562-584, October.
    12. Lee, Wai Sing & Kwok, Chuck C. Y., 2000. "Domestic and international practice of deposit insurance: a survey," Journal of Multinational Financial Management, Elsevier, vol. 10(1), pages 29-62, January.
    13. Hyosoon Choi & Wook Sohn, 2014. "Regulatory Forbearance And Depositor Market Discipline: Evidence From Savings Banks In Korea," Contemporary Economic Policy, Western Economic Association International, vol. 32(1), pages 203-218, January.
    14. Chiang, Shu Ling & Tsai, Ming Shann, 2020. "The valuation of deposit insurance allowing for the interest rate spread and early-bankruptcy risk," The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 76(C), pages 345-356.
    15. Francis, Bill B. & Hunter, Delroy M., 2004. "The impact of the euro on risk exposure of the world's major banking industries," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 23(7-8), pages 1011-1042.
    16. Shuji Kobayakawa, 1998. "Designing incentive-compatible regulation in banking: the role of penalty in the precommitment approach," Economic Policy Review, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, vol. 4(Oct), pages 145-153.
    17. William Gissy, 2000. "Regulatory forbearance: A reconsideration," International Advances in Economic Research, Springer;International Atlantic Economic Society, vol. 6(4), pages 722-729, November.
    18. Sun, Yanshuo & Gong, Hengye & Guo, Qianwen & Schonfeld, Paul & Li, Zhongfei, 2020. "Regulating a public transit monopoly under asymmetric cost information," Transportation Research Part B: Methodological, Elsevier, vol. 139(C), pages 496-522.
    19. Osano, Hiroshi, 2002. "Managerial compensation contract and bank bailout policy," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 26(1), pages 25-49, January.
    20. Natalya A. Schenck & John H. Thornton, 2016. "Charter values, bailouts and moral hazard in banking," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 49(2), pages 172-202, April.
    21. Morrison, Alan D. & White, Lucy, 2011. "Deposit insurance and subsidized recapitalizations," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 35(12), pages 3400-3416.
    22. Klaus P. Fischer & Martin Chenard, 1997. "Financial Liberalization Causes Banking System Fragility," Finance 9706004, University Library of Munich, Germany.

  3. Fulghieri, P. & Nagarajan, S., 1992. "On the Strategic Role of High Leverage in Entry Deterrence," Papers 92-10, Columbia - Graduate School of Business.

    Cited by:

    1. Aron A. Gottesman, 2004. "The Strategic use of Convertible Debt in “Deep Pocket†Predatory Games," The American Economist, Sage Publications, vol. 48(1), pages 50-60, March.
    2. Rosellon Cifuentes, M.A., 1999. "Essays on financial policy, liquidation values and product markets," Other publications TiSEM 802f644e-3e93-4815-bf33-8, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    3. Ormazabal, Gaizka & Ferrés, Daniel & Sertsios, Giorgio & Povel, Paul, 2017. "Capital Structure Under Collusion," CEPR Discussion Papers 12151, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    4. Michi Nishihara & Takashi Shibata, 2014. "Preemption, leverage, and financing constraints," Review of Financial Economics, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 23(2), pages 75-89, April.
    5. Ulrich Hege, 2010. "Acquisition Values and Optimal Financial (In)Flexibility," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 23(7), pages 2865-2899, July.
    6. Michi Nishihara & Takashi Shibata, 2020. "Optimal capital structure and bankruptcy cascades," Discussion Papers in Economics and Business 20-10, Osaka University, Graduate School of Economics.
    7. Nishihara, Michi & Shibata, Takashi, 2021. "Optimal capital structure and simultaneous bankruptcy of firms in corporate networks," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 133(C).
    8. Arping, Stefan & Diaw, Khaled M., 2008. "Sunk costs, entry deterrence, and financial constraints," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 26(2), pages 490-501, March.
    9. Astrid Matthey, 2007. "Do Public Banks have a Competitive Advantage?," Jena Economics Research Papers 2007-100, Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena.
    10. Lorenzo Esposito, 2014. "Con Annibale alle porte. L'internazionalizzazione del sistema bancario e il caso italiano," Moneta e Credito, Economia civile, vol. 67(266), pages 311-338.
    11. Leach, J. Chris & Moyen, Nathalie & Yang, Jing, 2013. "On the strategic use of debt and capacity in rapidly expanding markets," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 23(C), pages 332-344.
    12. Leach, J. Chris & Moyen, Nathalie & Yang, Jing, 2004. "On the Strategic Use of Debt and Capacity in Imperfectly Competitive Product Markets," SIFR Research Report Series 33, Institute for Financial Research.
    13. Ernesto Schargrodsky, 2002. "The Effect of Product Market Competition on Capital Structure: Empirical Evidence from the Newspaper Industry," Business School Working Papers veintiocho, Universidad Torcuato Di Tella.
    14. Zhou, Dequn & Wu, Changsong & Wang, Qunwei & Zha, Donglan, 2019. "Response of scale and leverage of thermal power enterprises to renewable power enterprises in China," Applied Energy, Elsevier, vol. 251(C), pages 1-1.

  4. Fulghieri, P. & Nagarajan, S., 1991. "Financial Contracts as Lasting Commitments: The Case of Leveraged Oligopoly," Papers 92-01, Columbia - Graduate School of Business.

    Cited by:

    1. Nagarajan, S. & Sealey, C. W., 1995. "Forbearance, deposit insurance pricing, and incentive compatible bank regulation," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 19(6), pages 1109-1130, September.
    2. Fulghieri, P. & Nagarajan, S., 1996. "On the strategic role of high leverage in entry deterrence," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 20(1), pages 1-23, January.
    3. Rosellon Cifuentes, M.A., 1999. "Essays on financial policy, liquidation values and product markets," Other publications TiSEM 802f644e-3e93-4815-bf33-8, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    4. Frank Schuhmacher, 2001. "Verhandlungssichere Finanzierungsverträge im Dyopol," Schmalenbach Journal of Business Research, Springer, vol. 53(2), pages 127-154, March.
    5. Venkat Subramaniam, 1998. "Efficient Sourcing and Debt Financing in Imperfect Product Markets," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 44(9), pages 1167-1178, September.
    6. Matthew J. Clayton, 1999. "Debt, Investment, and Product Market Competition," New York University, Leonard N. Stern School Finance Department Working Paper Seires 99-056, New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business-.
    7. Faure-Grimaud, Antoine, 2000. "Product market competition and optimal debt contracts: The limited liability effect revisited," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 44(10), pages 1823-1840, December.
    8. Zechner, Josef, 1996. "Financial market-product market interactions in industry equilibrium: Implications for information acquisition decisions," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 40(3-5), pages 883-896, April.
    9. Engelbert J. Dockner & Helmut Elsinger & Andrea Gaunersdorfer, 2018. "The Strategic Role of Dividends and Debt in Markets with Imperfect Competition," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, vol. 8(3), pages 601-619, September.
    10. Giacinta Cestone, 1999. "Corporate Financing and Product Market Competition: An Overview," CSEF Working Papers 18, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy.
    11. Martin, Richard, 2003. "Debt financing and entry," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 21(4), pages 533-549, April.
    12. Matthew J. Clayton, 1996. "Debt, Investment, and Product Market Competition," New York University, Leonard N. Stern School Finance Department Working Paper Seires 96-21, New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business-.
    13. Spagnolo, Giancarlo, 1998. "Debt as a (Credible) Collusive Device, or: "Everybody Happy but the Consumer"," SSE/EFI Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance 243, Stockholm School of Economics, revised 01 Aug 2004.

Articles

  1. Tim Bunnell & S. Nagarajan & Andrew Willford, 2010. "From the Margins to Centre Stage: ‘Indian’ Demonstration Effects in Malaysia’s Political Landscape," Urban Studies, Urban Studies Journal Limited, vol. 47(6), pages 1257-1278, May.

    Cited by:

    1. Delik Hudalah & Haryo Winarso & Johan Woltjer, 2016. "Gentrifying the peri-urban: Land use conflicts and institutional dynamics at the frontier of an Indonesian metropolis," Urban Studies, Urban Studies Journal Limited, vol. 53(3), pages 593-608, February.

  2. Nagarajan, S. & Sealey, C. W., 1998. "State-contingent regulatory mechanisms and fairly priced deposit insurance," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 22(9), pages 1139-1156, September.

    Cited by:

    1. Marshall, David A. & Prescott, Edward Simpson, 2001. "Bank capital regulation with and without state-contingent penalties," Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy, Elsevier, vol. 54(1), pages 139-184, June.
    2. Kenneth Kasa & Mark M. Spiegel, 1999. "The role of relative performance in bank closure decisions," Working Papers in Applied Economic Theory 99-07, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco.
    3. Marshall, David A. & Prescott, Edward Simpson, 2006. "State-contingent bank regulation with unobserved actions and unobserved characteristics," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 30(11), pages 2015-2049, November.
    4. Ettore Panetti, 2017. "A Theory of Bank Illiquidity and Default with Hidden Trades," Review of Finance, European Finance Association, vol. 21(3), pages 1123-1157.
    5. Juha-Pekka Niinimäki, 2003. "Fairly Priced Deposit Insurance under Adverse Selection," Finnish Economic Papers, Finnish Economic Association, vol. 16(1), pages 38-48, Spring.
    6. Azmat, Saad & Hassan, M. Kabir & Ghaffar, Hamza & Azad, A.S.M. Sohel, 2021. "State contingent banking and asset price bubbles: The case of Islamic banking industry," Global Finance Journal, Elsevier, vol. 50(C).
    7. David A. Marshall & Edward Simpson Prescott, 2004. "State-Contingent Bank Regulation with Unobserved Actions and Unobserved Characteristics," Working Papers wp2004_0407, CEMFI.

  3. Fulghieri, P. & Nagarajan, S., 1996. "On the strategic role of high leverage in entry deterrence," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 20(1), pages 1-23, January.
    See citations under working paper version above.
  4. Nagarajan S., 1995. "On the Generic Efficiency of Takeovers under Incomplete Information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 65(2), pages 522-556, April.

    Cited by:

    1. Chemla, G., 1999. "L'impact de la negociation et des prises de controle sur l'ampleur de l'effet de Cliquet," Papers 99-19, Paris X - Nanterre, U.F.R. de Sc. Ec. Gest. Maths Infor..
    2. Chemla, Gilles, 2004. "Takeovers and the dynamics of information flows," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 22(4), pages 575-590, April.

  5. Nagarajan, S. & Sealey, C. W., 1995. "Forbearance, deposit insurance pricing, and incentive compatible bank regulation," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 19(6), pages 1109-1130, September.
    See citations under working paper version above.
  6. Fulghieri, Paolo & Nagarajan, S., 1992. "Financial contracts as lasting commitments: The case of a leveraged oligopoly," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 2(1), pages 2-32, March.
    See citations under working paper version above.

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