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Miguel Aramendia

Personal Details

First Name:Miguel
Middle Name:
Last Name:Aramendia
Suffix:
RePEc Short-ID:par316
http://bridgebilbao.es/pag/84/aramendia.html

Affiliation

(50%) Departamento de Economía Aplicada IV (Matemáticas)
Facultad de Economía y Empresa
Universidad del País Vasco - Euskal Herriko Unibertsitatea

Bilbao, Spain
http://www.ehu.es/econap4/
RePEc:edi:d4ehues (more details at EDIRC)

(50%) Bilbao Research in Decisions, Games and Economics (BRiDGE)
Facultad de Economía y Empresa
Universidad del País Vasco - Euskal Herriko Unibertsitatea

Bilbao, Spain
http://www.bridgebilbao.es/
RePEc:edi:bridges (more details at EDIRC)

Research output

as
Jump to: Articles

Articles

  1. Aramendia, Miguel & Wen, Quan, 2015. "Repeated Cournot model with justifiable punishments," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 136(C), pages 171-174.
  2. Miguel Aramendia & Quan Wen, 2014. "Forward-Looking Principle In Repeated Games," International Game Theory Review (IGTR), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 16(04), pages 1-16.
  3. Aramendia, Miguel & Wen, Quan, 2014. "Justifiable punishments in repeated games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 88(C), pages 16-28.
  4. Aramendia, Miguel, 2008. "Asymmetric punishments for group deviations in the infinitely repeated Cournot model," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 99(2), pages 246-248, May.
  5. Aramendia Miguel & Ruiz Luis & Wen Quan, 2008. "Forgiving-Proof Equilibrium in Infinitely Repeated Games," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 8(1), pages 1-17, February.
  6. Miguel Aramendia, 2008. "Individual best response in the repeated Cournot model," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 93(3), pages 293-304, April.
  7. Aramendia, Miguel, 2006. "Asymmetric finite punishments in repeated games," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 92(2), pages 234-239, August.
  8. Aramendia, Miguel & Larrea, Concepcion & Ruiz, Luis, 2005. "Renegotiation in the repeated Cournot model," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 52(1), pages 1-19, July.
  9. M. Aramendia & L. Ruiz & F. Valenciano, 2004. "The Forgiving Trigger Strategy: An Alternative To The Trigger Strategy," International Game Theory Review (IGTR), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 6(02), pages 247-264.

Citations

Many of the citations below have been collected in an experimental project, CitEc, where a more detailed citation analysis can be found. These are citations from works listed in RePEc that could be analyzed mechanically. So far, only a minority of all works could be analyzed. See under "Corrections" how you can help improve the citation analysis.

Articles

  1. Aramendia, Miguel & Wen, Quan, 2015. "Repeated Cournot model with justifiable punishments," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 136(C), pages 171-174.

    Cited by:

    1. Yi-Shan Lu & Chien-Shu Tsai & Jen-Yao Lee & Chung-Yang Lee, 2024. "Collusive Stability with Relative Performance and Network Externalities," Games, MDPI, vol. 15(3), pages 1-7, June.

  2. Aramendia, Miguel & Wen, Quan, 2014. "Justifiable punishments in repeated games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 88(C), pages 16-28.

    Cited by:

    1. Wei, Dong, 2019. "A model of trust building with anonymous re-matching," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 158(C), pages 311-327.
    2. Yi-Shan Lu & Chien-Shu Tsai & Jen-Yao Lee & Chung-Yang Lee, 2024. "Collusive Stability with Relative Performance and Network Externalities," Games, MDPI, vol. 15(3), pages 1-7, June.
    3. Aramendia, Miguel & Wen, Quan, 2020. "Myopic perception in repeated games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 119(C), pages 1-14.
    4. Aramendia, Miguel & Wen, Quan, 2015. "Repeated Cournot model with justifiable punishments," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 136(C), pages 171-174.

  3. Aramendia Miguel & Ruiz Luis & Wen Quan, 2008. "Forgiving-Proof Equilibrium in Infinitely Repeated Games," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 8(1), pages 1-17, February.

    Cited by:

    1. Kyle Bagwell, 2009. "Self-Enforcing Trade Agreements and Private Information," NBER Working Papers 14812, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.

  4. Miguel Aramendia, 2008. "Individual best response in the repeated Cournot model," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 93(3), pages 293-304, April.

    Cited by:

    1. João Correia-da-Silva & Joana Pinho & Hélder Vasconcelos, 2016. "Sustaining collusion in markets with entry driven by balanced growth," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 118(1), pages 1-34, May.

  5. Aramendia, Miguel, 2006. "Asymmetric finite punishments in repeated games," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 92(2), pages 234-239, August.

    Cited by:

    1. Miguel Aramendia, 2008. "Individual best response in the repeated Cournot model," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 93(3), pages 293-304, April.
    2. Aramendia, Miguel, 2008. "Asymmetric punishments for group deviations in the infinitely repeated Cournot model," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 99(2), pages 246-248, May.

  6. Aramendia, Miguel & Larrea, Concepcion & Ruiz, Luis, 2005. "Renegotiation in the repeated Cournot model," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 52(1), pages 1-19, July.

    Cited by:

    1. Andersson, Ola & Wengström, Erik, 2010. "Costly Renegotiation in Repeated Bertrand Games," SSE/EFI Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance 725, Stockholm School of Economics.
    2. Matthew Embrey & Friederike Mengel & Ronald Peeters, 2016. "Strategy Revision Opportunities and Collusion," Working Paper Series 08716, Department of Economics, University of Sussex Business School.
    3. Aramendia, Miguel, 2006. "Asymmetric finite punishments in repeated games," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 92(2), pages 234-239, August.
    4. Larrea, C. & Ruiz, L., 2015. "Simple coalitional strategy profiles in repeated games," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 76(C), pages 125-130.
    5. Harbord, David & Fehr, Nils Henrik von der, 2011. "Coordination, compensation and the expansion of trade: The merchant guilds revisited," MPRA Paper 40992, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    6. Harbord, David, 2006. "Enforcing cooperation among medieval merchants: The Maghribi traders revisited," MPRA Paper 1889, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    7. Aramendia, Miguel & Wen, Quan, 2015. "Repeated Cournot model with justifiable punishments," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 136(C), pages 171-174.

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