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Bangladesh : The Experience and Perceptions of Public Officials

Author

Listed:
  • Ranjana Mukherjee
  • Omer Gokcekus
  • Nick Manning
  • Pierre Landell-Mills

Abstract

This report summarizes the responses of Bangladeshi Class I (highest level) public sector officials to a survey seeking opinions on a number of civil service issues, from personnel management practices to rewards and disciplinary actions, and from employees' sources of income to the budget environment and procurement processes. Survey results show instances in Bangladesh's civil service where professional conduct is perceived to be sacrificed at the expense of personal and political concerns. Surveyed officials express a concern over patronage appointments in the recruitment of Class III and IV staff and unfavorable postings and transfers at the higher level. Corruption, insufficient budgetary allocation, and unpredictable budgets are identified as key impediments to achieving organizational objectives. The report utilizes the survey data to test prior assertions against the survey data. Data is analyzed to establish that institutions do matter for accountability; to explore an empirical association between elements of institutional environment and accountability; and to generate potential accountability payoffs for certain reform interventions. The analyzes show that reduced interference by politicians from outside and within the organizations, less micro-management by very senior civil servants and merit-based recruitment to Class I jobs will be most effective in reducing the perception of pervasive corruption.

Suggested Citation

  • Ranjana Mukherjee & Omer Gokcekus & Nick Manning & Pierre Landell-Mills, 2001. "Bangladesh : The Experience and Perceptions of Public Officials," World Bank Publications - Books, The World Bank Group, number 13861.
  • Handle: RePEc:wbk:wbpubs:13861
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. International Monetary Fund, 2000. "Bangladesh: Recent Economic Developments," IMF Staff Country Reports 2000/025, International Monetary Fund.
    2. Bendor, Jonathan & Mookherjee, Dilip, 1987. "Institutional Structure and the Logic of Ongoing Collective Action," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 81(1), pages 129-154, March.
    3. Manning, Nick & Mukherjee, Ranjana & Gokcekus, Omer, 2000. "Public officials and their institutional environment - an analytical model for assessing the impact of institutional change on public sector performance," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2427, The World Bank.
    4. Paul Seabright, 1993. "Managing Local Commons: Theoretical Issues in Incentive Design," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 7(4), pages 113-134, Fall.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Health Monitoring and Evaluation Economic Policy Institutions and Governance Governance - National Governance Poverty Reduction - Poverty Assessment Governance - Governance Indicators;

    JEL classification:

    • D70 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - General
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • D73 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption

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