Political Economy and Instruments of Environmental Politics

Economists argue that such market-based policy instruments as environmental taxes and emission trading systems are the best way to target the negative effects of pollution. Yet there is no agreement about whether the use of these instruments is sufficient, whether they are deployed efficiently, and which factors influence their effectiveness. Nor is it clear if such policies have had any significant effect on the urgent matter of climate change mitigation. This volume offers conceptual, empirical, and theoretical analyses of the effectiveness of these policy instruments in achieving environmental goals. Taken together, the chapters not only identify shortcomings of existing policy making, but also point to ways in which more effective policy design can help solve one of the most pressing problems of our time. The contributors consider such topics as theoretical approaches to address the failure of the free market to protect the environment, the influence of people’s trust in their government on their willingness to accept higher environmental taxes, political determinants of fossil fuel pricing, a game theoretic approach to understanding domestic political constraints on international environmental agreements, and intergenerational equity and carbon taxation. Contributors Elisa Belfiori, Frank J. Convery, Peter Egger, Denny Ellerman, Dominic Hauck, Philipp Hieronymi, Andrea Kollmann, Sonja Köke, Andreas Lange, Antony Millner, Francesco Nicolli, Sergey Nigai, Johannes Reichl, David Schüller, Jon Strand, Cees van Beers, Francesco Vona