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Collected Papers - Vol. 1

Author

Listed:
  • Robert J. Aumann

    (Hebrew University)

Abstract

Robert Aumann's groundbreaking career in game theory has spanned over 35 years. These two volumes provide convenient access to all of his major research--from his doctoral dissertation in 1956 to papers as recent as January 1995. Threaded through all of Aumann's work (symbolized in his thesis on knots) is the study of relationships between different ideas, between different phenomena, and between ideas and phenomena. "When you look closely at one scientific idea," writes Aumann, "you find it hitched to all others. It is these hitches that I have tried to study." The papers are organized in several categories: general, knot theory, decision theory (utility and subjective probability), strategic games, coalitional games, and mathematical methods. Aumann has written an introduction to each of these groups that briefly describes the content and background of each paper, including the motivation and the research process, and relates it to other work in the collection and to work by others. There is also a citation index that allows readers to trace the considerable body of literature which cites Aumann's own work.

Suggested Citation

  • Robert J. Aumann, 2000. "Collected Papers - Vol. 1," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262011549, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:mtp:titles:0262011549
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Walter Bossert & Kotaro Suzumura, 2015. "Expected utility without full transitivity," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 45(4), pages 707-722, December.
    2. Notteboom, Theo, 2006. "Chapter 19 Concession Agreements as Port Governance Tools," Research in Transportation Economics, Elsevier, vol. 17(1), pages 437-455, January.
    3. Christian Schmidt, 2006. "Quelques points de rencontre entre économistes et psychologues," Revue économique, Presses de Sciences-Po, vol. 57(2), pages 242-257.
    4. Larry Samuelson, 2016. "Game Theory in Economics and Beyond," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 30(4), pages 107-130, Fall.
    5. Lall Ramrattan & Michael Szenberg, 2012. "The impact of The General Theory on Economic Theory and the Development of Public Policies: A Nested Vision of Keynes’s Ideas with the Classical Vision through a Panoramic View of his Works," Chapters, in: Thomas Cate (ed.), Keynes’s General Theory, chapter 8, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    6. Güth, Werner & Kliemt, Hartmut, 2001. "Langzeiteffekte der Theory of Games and Economic Behavior: Zur Anwendung der Spieltheorie in den (Sozial-)wissenschaften," SFB 373 Discussion Papers 2001,8, Humboldt University of Berlin, Interdisciplinary Research Project 373: Quantification and Simulation of Economic Processes.
    7. Werner Güth & Hartmut Kliemt & Georg v. Wangenheim, 2006. "Verstehen, Verständigung, Vertrag - Ökonomik als Geistes-, Natur- und Staatswissenschaft," Papers on Strategic Interaction 2006-12, Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    game theory; knot theory; decision theory; strategic games; coalitional games; Robert Aumann;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • A31 - General Economics and Teaching - - Multisubject Collective Works - - - Multisubject Collected Writings of Individuals
    • C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory

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