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The Growth of Shadow Banking

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  • Thiemann,Matthias

Abstract

The 'shadow banking system' refers to a system of credit-provision occurring outside of the official regulatory perimeter of commercial banks. Facilitated by securitization vehicles, mutual funds, hedge funds, investment banks and mortgage companies, the function and regulation of these shadow banking institutions has come under increasing scrutiny after the subprime crisis of 2007–8. Matthias Thiemann examines how regulators came to tolerate the emergence of links between the banking and shadow banking systems. Through a comparative analysis of the US, France, the Netherlands and Germany, he argues that fractured domestic and global governance systems determining the regulatory approach to these links ultimately aggravated the recent financial crisis. Since 2008, shadow banking has even expanded and the incentives for banks to bend the rules have only increased with increasing regulation. Thiemann's empirical work suggests how state-finance relations could be restructured to keep the banking system under state control and avoid future financial collapses.

Suggested Citation

  • Thiemann,Matthias, 2018. "The Growth of Shadow Banking," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9781107161986, October.
    • Handle: RePEc:cup:cbooks:9781107161986
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Martin Hellwig, 2019. "Target-Falle oder Empörungsfalle? – Zur deutschen Diskussion um die Europäische Währungsunion," Discussion Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2019_05, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods.
    2. Anat R. Admati & Martin F. Hellwig, 2018. "Bank Leverage, Welfare, and Regulation," Discussion Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2018_13, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods.
    3. Braun, Benjamin, 2021. "From exit to control: The structural power of finance under asset manager capitalism," SocArXiv 4uesc, Center for Open Science.
    4. N/A, 2019. "Books Received: (current as of Spring 2019)," Review of Radical Political Economics, Union for Radical Political Economics, vol. 51(1), pages 173-176, March.
    5. Matthias Thiemann, 2021. "La relation asymétrique des banques centrales au financement de marché : une évaluation des implications pour la stabilité financière à la lumière des évènements lés à la Covid," Post-Print hal-03622943, HAL.
    6. Endrejat, Vanessa & Thiemann, Matthias, 2018. "Reviving the shadow banking chain in Europe: Regulatory agency, technical complexity and the dynamics of co-habitation," SAFE Working Paper Series 222, Leibniz Institute for Financial Research SAFE.
    7. Fletcher Baragar, 2020. "Books Received (as of Winter/Spring 2020)," Review of Radical Political Economics, Union for Radical Political Economics, vol. 52(1), pages 175-179, March.
    8. Tümmler, Mario & Thiemann, Matthias, 2020. "Beyond moral hazard arguments: The role of national deposit insurance schemes for member states' preferences on EDIS," SAFE White Paper Series 72, Leibniz Institute for Financial Research SAFE.
    9. N/A, 2022. "Books Received (as of March 2022)," Review of Radical Political Economics, Union for Radical Political Economics, vol. 54(1), pages 136-141, March.
    10. N/A, 2021. "RRPE Books Received: Spring 2021," Review of Radical Political Economics, Union for Radical Political Economics, vol. 53(1), pages 223-227, March.
    11. Leon Wansleben, 2021. "Divisions of regulatory labor, institutional closure, and structural secrecy in new regulatory states: The case of neglected liquidity risks in market‐based banking," Regulation & Governance, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 15(3), pages 909-932, July.
    12. Matthias Thiemann, 2021. "La relation asymétrique des banques centrales au financement de marché : une évaluation des implications pour la stabilité financière à la lumière des évènements lés à la Covid," SciencePo Working papers Main hal-03622943, HAL.

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