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Appointing Central Bankers

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  • Chang,Kelly H.

Abstract

This book examines monetary policy by focusing on how the President and the Senate influence monetary policy by appointing Federal Reserve members. It attempts to answer three questions about the appointment process and its effects. First, do politicians influence monetary policy through Federal Reserve appointments? Second, who influences the process - the President alone or both the President and the Senate? Third, what explains the structure of the Federal Reserve appointment process? The test models show that the President alone, both the President and Senate, or neither, may influence monetary policy with Federal Reserve appointments. The structure of the process reflects political battles between the Democrats and Republicans regarding the centralization of authority to set monetary policy within the Federal Reserve System. The study extends the analysis to the European Central Bank and shows that the Federal Reserve process is more representative of society than the European Central Bank process.

Suggested Citation

  • Chang,Kelly H., 2003. "Appointing Central Bankers," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521823333, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:cup:cbooks:9780521823333
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Bennani, Hamza & Kranz, Tobias & Neuenkirch, Matthias, 2018. "Disagreement between FOMC members and the Fed’s staff: New insights based on a counterfactual interest rate," Journal of Macroeconomics, Elsevier, vol. 58(C), pages 139-153.
    2. Schonhardt-Bailey, Cheryl & Dann, Christopher & Chapman, Jacob, 2022. "The accountability gap: Deliberation on monetary policy in Britain and America during the financial crisis," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 74(C).
    3. Schonhardt-Bailey, Cheryl & Dann, Christopher & Chapman, Jacob, 2022. "The accountability gap: deliberation on monetary policy in Britain and America during the financial crisis," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 114364, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    4. Seidmann, Daniel J., 2008. "Perverse committee appointments may foster divide and rule," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 92(3-4), pages 448-455, April.
    5. Yoshiharu Oritani, 2010. "Public governance of central banks: an approach from new institutional economics," BIS Working Papers 299, Bank for International Settlements.
    6. Hix, Simon & Hoyland, Bjorn & Vivyan, Nick, 2007. "From doves to hawks: a spatial analysis of voting in the Monetary Policy Committee of the Bank of England, 1997-2007," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 25199, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    7. Schnakenberg, Keith & Turner, Ian R & Uribe-McGuire, Alicia, 2021. "Allies or Commitment Devices? A Model of Appointments to the Federal Reserve," SocArXiv b5zts, Center for Open Science.
    8. Caitlin Ainsley, 2022. "Federal reserve appointments and the politics of senate confirmation," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 190(1), pages 93-110, January.
    9. Dahlvik Julia & Pohn-Weidinger Axel & Kollegger Martina, 2020. "Independence despite Political Appointment ? The Curious Case of the Austrian Ombudsman Board," NISPAcee Journal of Public Administration and Policy, Sciendo, vol. 13(2), pages 181-210, December.
    10. Keith E. Schnakenberg & Ian R. Turner & Alicia Uribe-McGuire, 2017. "Allies or commitment devices? A model of appointments to the Federal Reserve," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 29(2), pages 118-132, July.

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