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Equilibrium and Rationality

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  • Weirich,Paul

Abstract

This book represents a major contribution to game theory. It offers this conception of equilibrium in games: strategic equilibrium. This conception arises from a study of expected utility decision principles, which must be revised to take account of the evidence a choice provides concerning its outcome. The argument for these principles distinguishes reasons for action from incentives, and draws on contemporary analyses of counterfactual conditionals. The book also includes a procedure for identifying strategic equilibria in ideal normal-form games. In synthesizing decision theory and game theory in a powerful way this book will be of particular interest to all philosophers concerned with decision theory and game theory as well as economists and other social scientists.

Suggested Citation

  • Weirich,Paul, 1998. "Equilibrium and Rationality," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521593526.
    • Handle: RePEc:cup:cbooks:9780521593526
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    Cited by:

    1. Paul Weirich, 2007. "Collective, universal, and joint rationality," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 29(4), pages 683-701, December.
    2. Paul Weirich, 2017. "Epistemic Game Theory and Logic: Introduction," Games, MDPI, vol. 8(2), pages 1-3, March.
    3. Paul Weirich, 2011. "Exclusion from the social contract," Politics, Philosophy & Economics, , vol. 10(2), pages 148-169, May.

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