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Property-Rights-Verträge im Rahmen des Risikomanagements von Elementarschäden

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  • Lange, Jan

Abstract

Der vorliegende Artikel leistet einen Beitrag zur aktuellen Diskussion um eine möglichst effiziente Risikovorbeugung vor Elementarschäden in Deutschland. Im ersten Teil wird anhand eines einfach gehaltenen Modellszenarios die Anreizsituation von Staat, Bevölkerung und Versicherung zur Beteiligung an risikovorbeugenden Maßnahmen dargestellt. Im zweiten Teil wird unter Verwendung eines aus der Property-Rights-Literatur stammenden, leicht modifizierten Modells von Hart (2001) eine alternative Finanzierungsform öffentlicher Schutzprojekte (Deichbau) dargestellt. Ziel dieser Finanzierungsform ist eine gesteigerte Effizienz durch eine anreizkompatible Vertragsgestaltung sowie die Institutionalisierung der Zusammenarbeit ('joint venture') von Staat, Bevölkerung und Versicherungswirtschaft.

Suggested Citation

  • Lange, Jan, 2005. "Property-Rights-Verträge im Rahmen des Risikomanagements von Elementarschäden," German Risk and Insurance Review (GRIR), University of Cologne, Department of Risk Management and Insurance, vol. 1(3), pages 153-172.
    • Handle: RePEc:zbw:grirej:68736
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Jensen, Michael C, 1986. "Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance, and Takeovers," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 76(2), pages 323-329, May.
    2. Oliver Hart, 2001. "Financial Contracting," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 39(4), pages 1079-1100, December.
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