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Austerity, political control and supplier selection in English local government: implications for autonomy in multi-level systems

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  • Eckersley, Peter
  • Flynn, Anthony
  • Ferry, Laurence
  • Lakoma, Katarzyna

Abstract

Analysis of 60,000 contracts awarded by English councils between 2015–19 reveals that austerity constraints are a key predictor of councils outsourcing services to for-profit suppliers, regardless of their political control. Conservative Party-controlled councils are also more likely to contract with for-profit suppliers, although we found no link between Labour-controlled councils and not-for-profit suppliers, nor evidence that political or budgetary factors influence whether councils contract with providers based in their own region. We argue that centrally imposed funding cuts, and a belief that for-profit suppliers represent a cheaper option, could be overriding Labour Party councils' ideological preference for not-for-profit providers.

Suggested Citation

  • Eckersley, Peter & Flynn, Anthony & Ferry, Laurence & Lakoma, Katarzyna, 2021. "Austerity, political control and supplier selection in English local government: implications for autonomy in multi-level systems," EconStor Open Access Articles and Book Chapters, ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics, issue (Latest a.
    • Handle: RePEc:zbw:espost:253373
    DOI: 10.1080/14719037.2021.1930122
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