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Nash Equilibrium Of Collective Action On Social Networks With Indirect Connections And Social Control

Author

Listed:
  • QING-JUN LI

    (School of Economics and Management, Weifang University, No. 5147, Dongfeng East Street, Weifang, Shandong 261061, P. R. China)

  • HAI-HUA HU

    (��School of Management, Xi’an University of Architecture and Technology, Xi’an, Shaanxi 710055, P. R. China)

Abstract

This study aims to investigate how various forms of social control, namely selective incentive and behavioral conformity, collectively rationalize participation in collective action, through indirect network connections. To address it, we use a public game model and analyze the equilibrium conditions of the emergence of collective action on centralized, star-shaped networks and on decentralized, loop-shaped networks. The results show that social control is effective in motivating contribution towards a public good; however, the effect is highly dependent on the ratio of the benefits derived from selective incentive versus behavioral conformity as well as on the structure of social networks. Moreover, we find that indirect network connections can be an important route through which social control can improve the emergence of collective action. These findings have important implications for collective action theory and for intervention in collective actions.

Suggested Citation

  • Qing-Jun Li & Hai-Hua Hu, 2024. "Nash Equilibrium Of Collective Action On Social Networks With Indirect Connections And Social Control," The Singapore Economic Review (SER), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 69(08), pages 2581-2596, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:wsi:serxxx:v:69:y:2024:i:08:n:s021759082150003x
    DOI: 10.1142/S021759082150003X
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    Keywords

    Collective action; social networks; social control; Nash equilibrium;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C68 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling - - - Computable General Equilibrium Models
    • H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods

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