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Collusion In Private Procurement: How Does Mandatory Building Repair Increase Renovation Prices?

Author

Listed:
  • TIN CHEUK LEUNG

    (Wake Forest Economics Department, Wake Forest University, Winston-Salem, NC 27109, USA)

  • KWOK PING TSANG

    (Department of Economics, Virginia Tech, Blacksburg, VA 24061, USA)

  • KEVIN K. TSUI

    (Department of Economics, Clemson University, Clemson, SC 29634, USA4Zhongnan University of Economics and Law, Wuhan, Hubei 430073, P. R. China)

Abstract

This paper studies a regulatory change that significantly increases the prices of residential building renovation. In Hong Kong, where most people live in high-density condominiums, owners’ corporation arranges tender process to choose contractors on behalf of all homeowners when common areas of a building need maintenance and repair. Since 2012, the government has mandated selected buildings to finish such renovations within a year. Using propensity score matching method, we find that homeowners who received statutory notices to repair their building paid 40% more in bid price compared with those who did it voluntarily. After the mandatory scheme was introduced, all homeowners on average paid 40% more, and those who received the notices paid even higher prices. Moreover, these increases in prices are more pronounced in districts where condominiums are more expensive and residents are more educated. Finally, the major contractors’ bids became more correlated after the introduction of the mandatory scheme, suggesting that the scheme may have helped promote bid-rigging and corruption among contractors and owners’ corporations.

Suggested Citation

  • Tin Cheuk Leung & Kwok Ping Tsang & Kevin K. Tsui, 2022. "Collusion In Private Procurement: How Does Mandatory Building Repair Increase Renovation Prices?," The Singapore Economic Review (SER), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 67(05), pages 1759-1779, September.
  • Handle: RePEc:wsi:serxxx:v:67:y:2022:i:05:n:s0217590822430020
    DOI: 10.1142/S0217590822430020
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Housing regulations; bid-rigging; private procurement;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • K21 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Antitrust Law
    • L12 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Monopoly; Monopolization Strategies
    • R21 - Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics - - Household Analysis - - - Housing Demand

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