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The evolution of extortion strategy in the kagome lattice

Author

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  • Qian Zhao

    (School of Computer Science and Engineering, University of Electronic Science and Technology of China, Chengdu 610054, P. R. China)

  • Yajun Mao

    (School of Computer Science and Engineering, University of Electronic Science and Technology of China, Chengdu 610054, P. R. China)

  • Zhihai Rong

    (School of Computer Science and Engineering, University of Electronic Science and Technology of China, Chengdu 610054, P. R. China)

Abstract

The extortion strategy can let its surplus exceed its opponents by a fixed percentage, hence the influence of extortion strategy in a population games has drawn wide attention. In this paper, we study the evolution of extortion strategy with unconditional cooperation and unconditional defection strategies in the Kagome lattice with abundant triangles. Our investigation shows that the extortion strategy can act as catalysts to promote the evolution of cooperation in the networked Prisoner’s Dilemma game. Moreover, proper strength of extortion slope can improve the living environment of the cooperators, thus they enhance cooperation level in the network. Moreover, proper strength of extortion can not only enhance the cooperation level, but also delay the extinction of cooperation. The underlying overlapping triangles help individuals form cooperation cliques that play crucial roles for the evolution of cooperation in those lattices.

Suggested Citation

  • Qian Zhao & Yajun Mao & Zhihai Rong, 2020. "The evolution of extortion strategy in the kagome lattice," International Journal of Modern Physics C (IJMPC), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 31(11), pages 1-10, November.
    • Handle: RePEc:wsi:ijmpcx:v:31:y:2020:i:11:n:s0129183120501624
    DOI: 10.1142/S0129183120501624
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    Cited by:

    1. Lee, Hsuan-Wei & Cleveland, Colin & Szolnoki, Attila, 2022. "Mercenary punishment in structured populations," Applied Mathematics and Computation, Elsevier, vol. 417(C).

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