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Mechanism Design For Optimal Auction Of Divisible Goods

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  • CONGJUN RAO

    (Institute of Systems Engineering, Huazhong University of Science and Technology, Wuhan 430074, P.R. China;
    College of Mathematics and Information Science, Huanggang Normal University, Huanggang 438000, P.R. China)

  • YONG ZHAO

    (Institute of Systems Engineering, Huazhong University of Science and Technology, Wuhan 430074, P.R. China)

Abstract

In this paper, the auction of divisible goods is investigated and a mechanism design method for optimal auction of divisible goods is presented. First, the definitions of feasible allocations and divisible goods auctions are given based on several important assumptions of divisible goods auction. Second, an optimal auction mechanism of divisible goods is designed, and a method of how to use the uniform price auction to implement the optimal auctions is discussed under the background of allocating the total permitted pollution discharge capacity (TPPDC). Lastly, this method is applied to the environmental planning of Wuhan City Circle in Hubei Province, China.

Suggested Citation

  • Congjun Rao & Yong Zhao, 2010. "Mechanism Design For Optimal Auction Of Divisible Goods," International Journal of Information Technology & Decision Making (IJITDM), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 9(05), pages 831-845.
    • Handle: RePEc:wsi:ijitdm:v:09:y:2010:i:05:n:s0219622010004044
    DOI: 10.1142/S0219622010004044
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    Cited by:

    1. Congjun Rao & Yong Zhao & Junjun Zheng & Mark Goh & Cheng Wang, 2017. "Bidding Behavior and Equilibrium Excursion of Uniform Price Auction Mechanism," Asia-Pacific Journal of Operational Research (APJOR), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 34(06), pages 1-17, December.

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