Selfish Grower Behavior Can Group-optimally Eradicate Plant Diseases Caused by Coinfection

Game-theoretic behavioral and epidemiological models suggest that it is impossible to eradicate a disease through voluntary control actions when individuals behave according to their own interests. The simple reason is that free-riding behavior, which is best for self-interest, leads to a control coverage on the group level that is insufficient to eradicate the disease. Here we show that, for diseases that are caused by coinfection, self-interest can actually result in the socially optimal outcome of disease eradication. Our result challenges the conventional wisdom that selfish behavior undermines the group interest; it resolves a social dilemma in the absence of any cooperation, institutional arrangements, or social norms. Our model is motivated by coinfecting plant viruses, common among agricultural crops and natural plants, and the behavioral dynamics of growers to adopt protective action (biological or chemical control). The epidemiological scenario, in which the disease is eradicated by self-interest, is characterized by a positive feedback process in which coinfection enhances infectivity. Similar feedback structures exist for a range of typical epidemiological processes that facilitate disease persistence if prevalence is sufficiently large. The underlying mechanism may therefore be applicable to other diseases.