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Linear-State Differential Games in Partition Function Form

Author

Listed:
  • Simon Hoof

    (Department of Economics, Paderborn University, Paderborn, Germany)

Abstract

We introduce a partition function for n-player linear-state cooperative differential games. The value of a coalition within a given coalition structure is defined as its noncooperative equilibrium payoff of a game played between the coalitions. We also define two core notions, namely, the cautious and the singleton core. If the game is convex, then the cores are nonempty. In order to illustrate the approach, we consider a symmetric game of pollution accumulation.

Suggested Citation

  • Simon Hoof, 2019. "Linear-State Differential Games in Partition Function Form," International Game Theory Review (IGTR), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 21(04), pages 1-13, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:wsi:igtrxx:v:21:y:2019:i:04:n:s0219198919500063
    DOI: 10.1142/S0219198919500063
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    Cited by:

    1. Gonzalez, Stéphane & Rostom, Fatma Zahra, 2022. "Sharing the global outcomes of finite natural resource exploitation: A dynamic coalitional stability perspective," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 119(C), pages 1-10.
    2. Stéphane Gonzalez & Fatma Zahra Rostom, 2019. "Sharing the Global Benefits of Finite Natural Resource Exploitation: A Dynamic Coalitional Stability Perspective," Working Papers 1937, Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique Lyon St-Étienne (GATE Lyon St-Étienne), Université de Lyon.

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