IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/wsi/igtrxx/v13y2011i01ns0219198911002812.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Active Vs. Passive Defense Against A Strategic Attacker

Author

Listed:
  • KJELL HAUSKEN

    (Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Stavanger, N-4036 Stavanger, Norway)

  • GREGORY LEVITIN

    (Collaborative Autonomic Computing Laboratory, School of Computer Science, University of Electronic Science and Technology of China, China;
    The Israel Electric Corporation, P. O. Box 10, Haifa 31000, Israel)

Abstract

The article analyzes how a defender determines a balance between protecting an object (passive defense) and striking preventively against an attacker seeking to destroy the object (active defense). The attacker analogously determines a balance between attacking and protecting against the preventive strike. The defender makes its decision about striking preventively based on its estimate of the probability of being attacked. In both cases of preventive strike and no preventive strike, the defender anticipates the most harmful attacker's strategy. The influence of the ratio between the player's resources and the contest intensities on the solution of the game is analyzed.

Suggested Citation

  • Kjell Hausken & Gregory Levitin, 2011. "Active Vs. Passive Defense Against A Strategic Attacker," International Game Theory Review (IGTR), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 13(01), pages 1-12.
    • Handle: RePEc:wsi:igtrxx:v:13:y:2011:i:01:n:s0219198911002812
    DOI: 10.1142/S0219198911002812
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.worldscientific.com/doi/abs/10.1142/S0219198911002812
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1142/S0219198911002812?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Gao, Kaiye & Yan, Xiangbin & Liu, Xiang-dong & Peng, Rui, 2019. "Object defence of a single object with preventive strike of random effect," Reliability Engineering and System Safety, Elsevier, vol. 186(C), pages 209-219.
    2. McCarter, Matthew & Barker, Kash & Johansson, Jonas & Ramirez-Marquez, Jose E., 2018. "A bi-objective formulation for robust defense strategies in multi-commodity networks," Reliability Engineering and System Safety, Elsevier, vol. 176(C), pages 154-161.
    3. Hausken, Kjell, 2024. "Fifty Years of Operations Research in Defense," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 318(2), pages 355-368.
    4. Kjell Hausken, 2019. "Principal–Agent Theory, Game Theory, and the Precautionary Principle," Decision Analysis, INFORMS, vol. 16(2), pages 105-127, June.
    5. Nakao, Keisuke, 2019. "Modeling Deterrence by Denial and by Punishment," MPRA Paper 95100, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    6. Wu, Di & Xiao, Hui & Peng, Rui, 2018. "Object defense with preventive strike and false targets," Reliability Engineering and System Safety, Elsevier, vol. 169(C), pages 76-80.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Survivability; active defense; passive defense; attack; protection; contest intensity; JEL Classification Number: C7;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • B4 - Schools of Economic Thought and Methodology - - Economic Methodology
    • C0 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - General
    • C6 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling
    • C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
    • D5 - Microeconomics - - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium
    • D7 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making
    • M2 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Business Economics

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:wsi:igtrxx:v:13:y:2011:i:01:n:s0219198911002812. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Tai Tone Lim (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.worldscinet.com/igtr/igtr.shtml .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.