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Refinements Of Nash Equilibria In View Of Jealous Or Friendly Behavior Of Players

Author

Listed:
  • AGNIESZKA RUSINOWSKA

    (Department of Philosophy, Tilburg University, P.O. Box 90153, 5000 LE Tilburg, The Netherlands;
    Warsaw School of Economics, Institute of Econometrics, Al. Niepodleglosci 162, 02-554 Warsaw, Poland)

Abstract

In this paper, several bargaining models, differing in some assumptions from each other, are analyzed. We consider a discrete case and a continuous case. In the former model, players bargain over a division ofnobjects. In the latter, parties divide one unit of infinitely divisible good. We start with an analysis of the one-round model, and then we consider a model in which players can continue to bargain. For each model, simultaneous moves as well as alternating offers of players are considered. The assumption that each player receives no more than his/her opponent proposes giving to him/her is the common assumption for all cases analyzed. Moreover, we adopt some assumptions concerning players' attitudes towards their opponents' payments, assuming that players can be either jealous or friendly. In view of the jealousy or friendliness of players, Nash equilibrium and subgame perfect equilibrium are described.

Suggested Citation

  • Agnieszka Rusinowska, 2002. "Refinements Of Nash Equilibria In View Of Jealous Or Friendly Behavior Of Players," International Game Theory Review (IGTR), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 4(03), pages 281-299.
    • Handle: RePEc:wsi:igtrxx:v:04:y:2002:i:03:n:s0219198902000707
    DOI: 10.1142/S0219198902000707
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Giuseppe De Marco & Jacqueline Morgan, 2007. "Social Networks: Equilibrium Selection and Friendliness," CSEF Working Papers 198, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy.
    2. G. De Marco & J. Morgan, 2008. "Slightly Altruistic Equilibria," Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications, Springer, vol. 137(2), pages 347-362, May.
    3. Gonzalez-Sanchez, Eric & Loyola, Gino, 2024. "Ultimatum bargaining with envy under incomplete information," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 127(C), pages 1-11.
    4. Ohnishi, Kazuhiro, 2018. "Non-Altruistic Equilibria," MPRA Paper 88347, University Library of Munich, Germany.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Bargaining model; Nash equilibrium; exact potential game; subgame perfect equilibrium;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • B4 - Schools of Economic Thought and Methodology - - Economic Methodology
    • C0 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - General
    • C6 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling
    • C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
    • D5 - Microeconomics - - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium
    • D7 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making
    • M2 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Business Economics

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