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Cores Of Stochastic Cooperative Games With Stochastic Orders

Author

Listed:
  • F. R. FERNÁNDEZ

    (Departamento de Estadística e Investigación Operativa Facultad de Matematicas, Universidad de Sevilla, 41012 Sevilla, Spain)

  • J. PUERTO

    (Departamento de Estadística e Investigación Operativa Facultad de Matematicas, Universidad de Sevilla, 41012 Sevilla, Spain)

  • M. J. ZAFRA

    (Departamento de Estadística e Investigación Operativa Facultad de Matematicas, Universidad de Sevilla, 41012 Sevilla, Spain)

Abstract

In this paper we analyze cooperative games where the worth of a coalition is uncertain and the players only know their probability distribution. The novelty of our analysis is that the comparison among the uncertain values is done by stochastic orders among random variables. Thus, the classical concepts in cooperative game theory have to be revisited and redefined. This form of comparison leads to two-different notions of core. Conditions are given under which these cores are nonempty. The results are applied on three families of stochastic games.

Suggested Citation

  • F. R. Fernández & J. Puerto & M. J. Zafra, 2002. "Cores Of Stochastic Cooperative Games With Stochastic Orders," International Game Theory Review (IGTR), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 4(03), pages 265-280.
  • Handle: RePEc:wsi:igtrxx:v:04:y:2002:i:03:n:s0219198902000690
    DOI: 10.1142/S0219198902000690
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. J. Puerto & F. Fernández & Y. Hinojosa, 2008. "Partially ordered cooperative games: extended core and Shapley value," Annals of Operations Research, Springer, vol. 158(1), pages 143-159, February.
    2. Benati, Stefano & López-Blázquez, Fernando & Puerto, Justo, 2019. "A stochastic approach to approximate values in cooperative games," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 279(1), pages 93-106.
    3. Xuan Vinh Doan & Tri-Dung Nguyen, 2019. "Technical Note—Robust Newsvendor Games with Ambiguity in Demand Distributions," Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 68(4), pages 1047-1062, July.
    4. Panfei Sun & Dongshuang Hou & Hao Sun, 2022. "Optimization implementation of solution concepts for cooperative games with stochastic payoffs," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 93(4), pages 691-724, November.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Cooperative games; core; stochastic orders;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • B4 - Schools of Economic Thought and Methodology - - Economic Methodology
    • C0 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - General
    • C6 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling
    • C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
    • D5 - Microeconomics - - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium
    • D7 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making
    • M2 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Business Economics

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