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Games Of Crowding

Author

Listed:
  • STEVE ALPERN

    (Department of Mathematics, The London School of Economics, Houghton Street, London WC2A 2AE, UK)

  • DIANE REYNIERS

    (Interdisciplinary Institute of Management, The London School of Economics, Houghton Street, London WC2A 2AE, UK)

Abstract

We introduce the notion of a "crowding game", where individuals choose to locate themselves among finitely many compartments, each with a capacity (size) and a cost (price). Individuals have a common notion of physical comfort (freedom from crowding), which is increasing in the size of their compartment, decreasing in the number (or mass) of other individuals choosing it. Where individuals differ is in their sensitivity to the cost of the compartment. Under these assumptions, we find unique equilibria in which no individual wishes to change compartments. After dealing with these notions of equilibrium play in games of crowding, we discuss the optimal design of such games by a supplier who can choose the capacities and costs of the compartments. The supplier's objective might be profit or welfare maximisation, or perhaps the maximisation of the number of individuals who enter some compartment.

Suggested Citation

  • Steve Alpern & Diane Reyniers, 2001. "Games Of Crowding," International Game Theory Review (IGTR), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 3(01), pages 27-56.
    • Handle: RePEc:wsi:igtrxx:v:03:y:2001:i:01:n:s0219198901000294
    DOI: 10.1142/S0219198901000294
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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • B4 - Schools of Economic Thought and Methodology - - Economic Methodology
    • C0 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - General
    • C6 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling
    • C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
    • D5 - Microeconomics - - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium
    • D7 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making
    • M2 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Business Economics

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