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On The Compensation Of Imperfect Information In Dynamic Games

Author

Listed:
  • JOSEF SHINAR

    (Faculty of Aerospace Engineering, Technion — Israel Institute of Technology, Haifa 32000, Israel)

  • TAL SHIMA

    (Faculty of Aerospace Engineering, Technion — Israel Institute of Technology, Haifa 32000, Israel)

  • VALERY Y. GLIZER

    (Faculty of Aerospace Engineering, Technion — Israel Institute of Technology, Haifa 32000, Israel)

Abstract

A linear pursuit-evasion game with first-order acceleration dynamics and bounded controls is considered. In this game, the pursuer has to estimate the state variables of the game, including the lateral acceleration of the evader, based on the noise-corrupted measurements of the relative position vector. The estimation process inherently involves some delay, rendering the information structure of the pursuer imperfect. If the pursuer implements the optimal strategy of the perfect information game, an evader with perfect information can take advantage of the estimation delay. However, the performance degradation is minimised if the pursuer compensates for its own estimation delay by implementing the optimal strategy derived from the solution of the imperfect (delayed) information game. In this paper the analytical solution of the delayed information game, allowing to predict the value of the game, is presented. The theoretical results are tested in a noise-corrupted scenario by Monte Carlo simulations, using a Kalman filter type estimator. The simulation results confirm the substantial improvement achieved by the new pursuer strategy.

Suggested Citation

  • Josef Shinar & Tal Shima & Valery Y. Glizer, 2000. "On The Compensation Of Imperfect Information In Dynamic Games," International Game Theory Review (IGTR), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 2(02n03), pages 229-248.
  • Handle: RePEc:wsi:igtrxx:v:02:y:2000:i:02n03:n:s0219198900000160
    DOI: 10.1142/S0219198900000160
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    Cited by:

    1. Yochanan Shachmurove & Reuel Shinnar (Deceased), 2012. "Do Chemical Reactors Hold the Solution for Global Economic Crises?," PIER Working Paper Archive 12-010, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • B4 - Schools of Economic Thought and Methodology - - Economic Methodology
    • C0 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - General
    • C6 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling
    • C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
    • D5 - Microeconomics - - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium
    • D7 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making
    • M2 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Business Economics

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