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A Searcher Versus Hider Game With Incomplete Information About Search Resources

Author

Listed:
  • ANDREY GARNAEV

    (Faculty of Applied Mathematics and Control Processes, St. Petersburg State University, Universitetskii Prospekt 35, Peterhof, St Petersburg 198504, Russia)

  • ROBBERT FOKKINK

    (Faculty of Electrical Engineering, Mathematics and Information Technology, Delft University, P.O.Box 5031, 2600, GA Delft, The Netherlands)

Abstract

We introduce a search game in which a hider has partial information about a searcher's resource. The hider can be a terrorist trying to hide and the searcher can be special forces trying to catch him. The terrorist does not know the number of forces involved in the search but just its distribution. We model this situation by a noncooperative game. In a related setup, which is motivated by wireless networks applications, the terrorist inserts a malicious node in a network, reducing network connectivity and thereby undermining its security. Meanwhile, the network operator applies appropriate measures to detect malicious nodes and maintain network performance. We investigate how the information about the total search resources that are available to the hider can influence the behavior of both players. For the case, where the distribution has two mass points, we prove that the game has a unique equilibrium and moreover, we describe explicitly this equilibrium, its structure and some other properties.

Suggested Citation

  • Andrey Garnaev & Robbert Fokkink, 2013. "A Searcher Versus Hider Game With Incomplete Information About Search Resources," Asia-Pacific Journal of Operational Research (APJOR), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 30(02), pages 1-15.
    • Handle: RePEc:wsi:apjorx:v:30:y:2013:i:02:n:s0217595912500522
    DOI: 10.1142/S0217595912500522
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    Cited by:

    1. Andrey Garnaev & Kensaku Kikuta, 2014. "Screening and hiding versus search," Mathematical Methods of Operations Research, Springer;Gesellschaft für Operations Research (GOR);Nederlands Genootschap voor Besliskunde (NGB), vol. 80(3), pages 255-265, December.

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