Does Ceo Incentive Pay Improve Bank Performance? A Quantile Regression Analysis Of U.S. Commercial Banks
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DOI: 10.1142/S2010495214400053
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References listed on IDEAS
- Robert DeYoung & Emma Y. Peng & Meng Yan, 2010. "Executive compensation and business policy choices at U.S. commercial banks," Research Working Paper RWP 10-02, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City.
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- Denise Rousseau & Byeong Jo Kim & Ryan Splenda & Sarah Young & Jangbum Lee & Donna Beck, 2023. "Does chief executive compensation predict financial performance or inaccurate financial reporting in listed companies: A systematic review," Campbell Systematic Reviews, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 19(4), December.
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More about this item
Keywords
Bank performance; CEO incentive pay; outside directors; quantile regression; G30; G34; J33;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- G30 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - General
- G34 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance
- J33 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - Compensation Packages; Payment Methods
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