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The Diversity In The Decision Facilitates Cooperation In The Sequential Prisoner'S Dilemma Game

Author

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  • TETSUSHI OHDAIRA

    (Department of Computational Intelligence and Systems Science, Interdisciplinary Graduate School of Science and Engineering, Tokyo Institute of Technology, J2-52 4259 Nagatsuta-cho, Midori-ku, Yokohama, 226-8502, Japan)

  • TAKAO TERANO

    (Department of Computational Intelligence and Systems Science, Interdisciplinary Graduate School of Science and Engineering, Tokyo Institute of Technology, J2-52 4259 Nagatsuta-cho, Midori-ku, Yokohama, 226-8502, Japan)

Abstract

The condition of cooperation in social conflicts of interest has been an interesting topic. On the one hand people usually desire to make their own profit. On the other hand, they mutually cooperate. This fact has motivated many researchers. Some solutions for this question have been proposed, and particular studies indicate that the diversity in decision-making or relationships promotes cooperation. In this research, we achieve the diversity by utilizing the novel method that refers to the mechanism of correction regarding each probability that every strategy comes to the representative by decision-making of group. This mechanism works when difference between the probability of the first and others becomes quite large. If once every group adopts this corrected decision, he/she achieves mutual cooperation of high level in the sequential prisoner's dilemma game in case the number of strategies (= players) is within the definite range. We also note that this game can effectively describe the property of evolution of strategy only with a small number of players. When each group has many players, in contrast to previous research, the decision with correction also has an effect on the suppression of prevalence of defection. In addition, we also show that the decision of this model is analogous to the system of redistribution of revenue, which provides balance of strength between several teams in professional sports.

Suggested Citation

  • Tetsushi Ohdaira & Takao Terano, 2011. "The Diversity In The Decision Facilitates Cooperation In The Sequential Prisoner'S Dilemma Game," Advances in Complex Systems (ACS), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 14(03), pages 377-401.
    • Handle: RePEc:wsi:acsxxx:v:14:y:2011:i:03:n:s0219525911002962
    DOI: 10.1142/S0219525911002962
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    1. anonymous, 2000. "Housing partnership blooms in East Texas," Banking and Community Perspectives, Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas, issue 2, pages 1-3.
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    Cited by:

    1. Tetsushi Ohdaira & Takao Terano, 2011. "Scale-Free Relationships Facilitate Cooperation in Spatial Games with Sequential Strategy," Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation, Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation, vol. 14(3), pages 1-3.
    2. Oliveira, Fernando S., 2023. "The emergence of social inequality: A Co-Evolutionary analysis," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 215(C), pages 192-206.

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