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Bribe And Punishment: Effects Of Signaling, Gossiping, And Bribery In Public Goods Games

Author

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  • A. L. C. BAZZAN

    (Inst. de Informática, UFRGS, C.P. 15064, 91501-970 P. Alegre, RS, Brazil)

  • SÍLVIO R. DAHMEN

    (Inst. de Física, UFRGS, C. P. 15051, 91501-970 P. Alegre, RS, Brazil)

Abstract

In public goods games, individuals contribute to create a benefit for a group. However this attracts free-riders, who enjoy the benefits without necessarily contributing. Nonetheless, in real-life scenarios cooperation does not collapse. Several explanations have been proposed in order to explain this phenomenon, such as punishment and signaling. In the present work, we investigate the effects of new elements associated with punishment upon signaling such as gossiping and bribery. Agents may denounce free-riders (who on their turn get punished) or may be bribed to remain silent and even spread rumors of false good behavior. Having a model with richer social mechanisms enable us to test how cooperation develops in situations in which players have social attachments. Our results show that when punishment and bribery are present, the levels of contribution are kept at a relatively higher value compared to the situation when no punishment is exercised. As to what regards gossiping, if the number of free-riders is high, finding mechanisms to prevent gossiping could be an important step in order to increase the contribution. If the ratio between free-riders and other agents is about one, then gossiping does affect contribution in a positive way.

Suggested Citation

  • A. L. C. Bazzan & Sílvio R. Dahmen, 2010. "Bribe And Punishment: Effects Of Signaling, Gossiping, And Bribery In Public Goods Games," Advances in Complex Systems (ACS), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 13(06), pages 755-771.
    • Handle: RePEc:wsi:acsxxx:v:13:y:2010:i:06:n:s0219525910002815
    DOI: 10.1142/S0219525910002815
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Charlotte Bruun (ed.), 2006. "Advances in Artificial Economics," Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems, Springer, number 978-3-540-37249-3, December.
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    Cited by:

    1. Wang, Qun & Wang, Hanchen & Zhang, Zhuxi & Li, Yumeng & Liu, Yu & Perc, Matjaž, 2018. "Heterogeneous investments promote cooperation in evolutionary public goods games," Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, Elsevier, vol. 502(C), pages 570-575.

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