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In the age of growing global populism, the continued popularity and relevance of a populist government is anchored on the ability of its populist leader to convince the voters that the primary objective of his foreign policies is to secure the interests of the state and its citizens. However, without an adequate level of state power, pursuing realist foreign policies to improve the state's relative gains and position in the international system can pose significant risks even for the most influential populist leader. Hence, the question is, how do populist leaders acquire an adequate level of state power to implement realist foreign policies, without ultimately losing their political capital and institutional legitimacy in the process? To answer this question, I develop a model that illustrates the three‐way linkage between populism, securitization, and realism. I use this model to explain the rationale behind President Donald Trump's ‘America First’ doctrine, as well as its implications for U.S. foreign policy making. I argue that “populist securitization” is a conduit through which populist leaders formulate, execute, and justify their realist foreign policies. Using Trump's securitization of the U.S. economy as a case study, I reveal how a populist securitization act can trigger the illiberal tendencies and nativist sentiments of the nationalistic voters, which, in turn, allow populist leaders to maintain their popularity and legitimacy among these voters while they experiment with realist foreign policies. En una era de creciente populismo global, la continua popularidad y relevancia de un gobierno populista esta anclada en la habilidad de su líder de convencer a los electores qué el principal objetivo de su política exterior es asegurar los intereses del estado y de sus ciudadanos. No obstante, sin un adecuado nivel de poder de estado, seguir políticas exteriores realistas para mejorar las ganancias y posición relativas del estado en el sistema internacional, puede presentar riesgos significativos aun para el líder populista. Por tanto la cuestión es ¿cómo adquieren los lideres populistas un adecuado nivel de poder de estado para implementar políticas exteriores realistas sin perder en el proceso su capital político y la legitimidad institucional? Para contestar esta pregunta, desarrollo un modelo para explicar la racionalidad subyacente de la doctrina de ‘Primero América’ del Presidente Donald Trump, así como sus implicaciones para la hechura de la política exterior de los Estados Unidos. Argumento que la ‘securitización populista’ es un conducto a través del cual los lideres populistas formulan, ejecutan, y justifican sus políticas exteriores realistas. Utilizo la securitización de la economía estadounidense de Trump como un caso de estudio, revelo cómo un acto de securitización populista puede desatar tendencias iliberales y sentimientos nativistas de los electores nacionalistas, que a su ves permiten a los lideres populistas mantener su popularidad y legitimidad entre dichos electores al tiempo que los lideres experimentan con políticas exteriores realistas. 在全球民粹主义不断发展的时代, 民粹主义政府的受欢迎度和相关性持续增加的条件在于, 政府领袖有能力说服选民相信其外交政策的主要目的是保护国家和公民的利益。然而, 假如没有足够的国家权力就去追寻现实主义外交政策, 意图提高国家在国际系统中的相对收益和位置, 则可能会带来显著风险, 甚至对最具影响力的民粹主义领袖也是如此。因此,问题在于, 民粹主义领袖如何获得充足的国家权力, 实施现实主义外交政策, 同时在此过程中不会最终失去其政治资本和制度正当性?为回答此问题, 作者提出一种模型, 用于阐明民粹主义、安全化和现实主义之间的三边关系。作者用该模型解释了美国总统唐纳德·特朗普提出的”美国第一”信条背后的根本原因,以及它对于美国外交政策制定的意义。作者主张, ”民粹主义安全化”(populist securitization)是一个导管, 民粹主义领袖通过此导管来制定、实施和辩护其现实主义外交政策。作者将特朗普对美国经济的安全化作为案例研究, 揭示了民粹主义安全化的行为如何能触发民族主义选民的不自由倾向和本土主义情绪, 这些则会反过来允许民粹主义领袖在尝试实行现实主义外交政策的同时, 维持其在上述选民中的受欢迎度和正当性。
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