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Flexible Bayesian analysis of first price auctions using a simulated likelihood

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  • Dong‐Hyuk Kim

Abstract

I propose a Bayesian method to analyze bid data from first‐price auctions under private value paradigms. I use a series representation to specify the valuation density so that bidding monotonicity is always satisfied, and I impose density affiliation by the nonparametric technique of Beresteanu (2007). This flexible method is, therefore, fully compatible with the underlying economic theory. To handle such a rich specification, I use a simulated likelihood, yet obtain a correct posterior by regarding the draws used for simulation as a latent variable to be augmented in the Bayesian framework; see Flury and Shephard, 2011. I provide a step‐by‐step guide of the method, report its performance from various perspectives, and compare the method with the existing one for a range of data generating processes and sample sizes. Finally, I analyze a bid sample for drilling rights in the outer continental shelf that has been widely studied and propose a reserve price that is decision theoretically optimal under parameter uncertainty.

Suggested Citation

  • Dong‐Hyuk Kim, 2015. "Flexible Bayesian analysis of first price auctions using a simulated likelihood," Quantitative Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 6(2), pages 429-461, July.
  • Handle: RePEc:wly:quante:v:6:y:2015:i:2:p:429-461
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    Cited by:

    1. Kim, Dong-Hyuk & Ratan, Anmol, 2022. "Disentangling risk aversion and loss aversion in first-price auctions: An empirical approach," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 150(C).
    2. Bougt, Daniel & Ghosh, Gagan & Liu, Heng, 2023. "Identification of interdependent values in sequential first-price auctions," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 91(C).
    3. Aryal, Gaurab & Grundl, Serafin & Kim, Dong-Hyuk & Zhu, Yu, 2018. "Empirical relevance of ambiguity in first-price auctions," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 204(2), pages 189-206.

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