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Franchising cooperation through chance cross‐constrained games

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  • Zhimin Huang

Abstract

This paper explores the role of franchising arrangements in the context of game theory. We assume a single franchisor and a single franchisee channel and address the impact of fixed lump‐sum fees, royalties, wholesale price, and retail price on the franchise contracts. We start with the chance cross‐constrained noncooperative situation where the franchisor, as the leader, first specifies his/her strategies. The franchisee, as the follower, then decides on his/her decision. We then relax the assumption of franchisee's inability to influence the franchisor's decisions and discuss cooperative situation between the franchisor and the franchisee. Nash's bargaining model is utilized to select the best Pareto‐efficient payment scheme for the franchisor and the franchisee to achieve their cooperation. © 2000 John Wiley & Sons, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 47: 669–685, 2000

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  • Zhimin Huang, 2000. "Franchising cooperation through chance cross‐constrained games," Naval Research Logistics (NRL), John Wiley & Sons, vol. 47(8), pages 669-685, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:wly:navres:v:47:y:2000:i:8:p:669-685
    DOI: 10.1002/1520-6750(200012)47:83.0.CO;2-S
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    Cited by:

    1. Liang Liang & Feng Yang & Wade Cook & Joe Zhu, 2006. "DEA models for supply chain efficiency evaluation," Annals of Operations Research, Springer, vol. 145(1), pages 35-49, July.
    2. Cai, Ya-Jun & Chen, Yue & Siqin, Tana & Choi, Tsan-Ming & Chung, Sai-Ho, 2019. "Pay upfront or pay later? Fixed royal payment in sustainable fashion brand franchising," International Journal of Production Economics, Elsevier, vol. 214(C), pages 95-105.
    3. Yue Chen & Sai-Ho Chung & Shu Guo, 2020. "Franchising contracts in fashion supply chain operations: models, practices, and real case study," Annals of Operations Research, Springer, vol. 291(1), pages 83-128, August.

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