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Toward optimal bidding strategies

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  • Andrew C. Stedry
  • H. David Brecht

Abstract

In this paper we investigate a form of rational behavior in response to an oligopoly pricing problem where only one buyer is involved. We investigate the problem from the standpoint of the seller who wants to maximize his gain from the transaction. In particular, we deal with the problem of one seller's response to an invitation to submit a sealed (i. e., noncooperative) bid to a government or other dominant purchasing agency for supplying a specified bundle of goods and services for which either (1) no other demand exists, or (2) the terms or quantities involved cannot, at least in the short run, be obtained from another source. Although treated from a normative standpoint, i. e., what bid the supplier should make, the paper also has implications for the buyer's behavior and oligopoly‐monopsony pricing in a more general sense.

Suggested Citation

  • Andrew C. Stedry & H. David Brecht, 1972. "Toward optimal bidding strategies," Naval Research Logistics Quarterly, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 19(3), pages 423-434, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:wly:navlog:v:19:y:1972:i:3:p:423-434
    DOI: 10.1002/nav.3800190303
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