IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/wly/natres/v28y2004i4p317-330.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Shareholder activism on environmental issues: A study of proposals at large US corporations (2000–2003)

Author

Listed:
  • Robert Monks
  • Anthony Miller
  • Jacqueline Cook

Abstract

Socially Responsible Investing (SRI) has carved out a niche in the financial world, and each year a large number of shareholder proposals are filed at public companies in the US related to issues of corporate social responsibility (CSR). While the primary interests of CSR activists remain distinct from those of traditional corporate governance (CG) activists, the two groups do share an interest in minimizing the risk of negative environmental or social impacts from the operations of the corporation. They also share the objective of achieving transparency and accountability in corporate decision‐making. In relation to this latter objective, they both face similar challenges concerning conflicts of interest among key institutional shareholders. This article examines the record of shareholder proposal filing and voting from 2000–2003 for 81 large US public corporations to determine the relative prominence of CSR shareholder activism and the prospects for effective CSR shareholder activism on key environmental issues. The analysis of these data finds that nearly half (45%) of all shareholder resolutions are related to CSR, and that those resolutions which combine issues of CSR with traditional CG activism appeal to slightly more shareholders than issues of CSR alone. The article also examines shareholder activism at the micro level with a case study of the voting record at ExxonMobil. The article finds that CSR‐related shareholder activism represents the majority of shareholder activism within that firm and that resolutions targeted at climate change are particularly well supported. These resolutions draw a connection between environmental risk and risk to shareholder value. While numerous challenges remain for both CG and CSR activists, the article concludes that reforms that strengthen shareholder rights and corporate governance more generally will also benefit CSR activists and the environmental policies they promote in particular. The article ends with some proposed solutions for addressing the perceived conflicts of interest in corporate governance and the shareholder voting process.

Suggested Citation

  • Robert Monks & Anthony Miller & Jacqueline Cook, 2004. "Shareholder activism on environmental issues: A study of proposals at large US corporations (2000–2003)," Natural Resources Forum, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 28(4), pages 317-330, November.
    • Handle: RePEc:wly:natres:v:28:y:2004:i:4:p:317-330
    DOI: 10.1111/j.1477-8947.2004.00104.x
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1477-8947.2004.00104.x
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1111/j.1477-8947.2004.00104.x?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Prevost, Andrew K & Rao, Ramesh P, 2000. "Of What Value Are Shareholder Proposals Sponsored by Public Pension Funds?," The Journal of Business, University of Chicago Press, vol. 73(2), pages 177-204, April.
    2. Tracy A. Thompson & Gerald F. Davis, 1997. "The Politics of Corporate Control and the Future of Shareholder Activism in the United States," Corporate Governance: An International Review, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 5(3), pages 152-159, July.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Ivan Diaz-Rainey & Paul A. Griffin & David H. Lont & Antonio J. Mateo-Márquez & Constancio Zamora-Ramírez, 2024. "Shareholder Activism on Climate Change: Evolution, Determinants, and Consequences," Journal of Business Ethics, Springer, vol. 193(3), pages 481-510, September.
    2. Rastad, Mahdi & Dobson, John, 2022. "Gender diversity on corporate boards: Evaluating the effectiveness of shareholder activism," The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 84(C), pages 446-461.
    3. Eunice S. Khoo & Li Chen & Gary S. Monroe, 2023. "Shareholder election of CSR committee members and its effects on CSR performance," Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 50(3-4), pages 716-763, March.
    4. Barros, Victor & Guedes, Maria João & Santos, Joana & Sarmento, Joaquim Miranda, 2023. "Shareholder activism and firms’ performance," Research in International Business and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 64(C).
    5. Haidong Li & Ziming Qian & Shanyong Wang & Jing Wang & Qian Wang, 2023. "Do green concerns promote corporate green innovation? Evidence from Chinese stock exchange interactive platforms," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 44(3), pages 1786-1801, April.
    6. Auzepy, Alix & Bannier, Christina E. & Martin, Fabio, 2023. "Walk the talk: Shareholders' soft engagement at annual general meetings," CFS Working Paper Series 689, Center for Financial Studies (CFS).
    7. Aimei Yang & Nur Uysal & Maureen Taylor, 2018. "Unleashing the Power of Networks: Shareholder Activism, Sustainable Development and Corporate Environmental Policy," Business Strategy and the Environment, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 27(6), pages 712-727, September.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Ilya Ivaninskiy & Irina Ivashkovskaya & Joseph A. McCahery, 2023. "Does digitalization mitigate or intensify the principal-agent conflict in a firm?," Journal of Management & Governance, Springer;Accademia Italiana di Economia Aziendale (AIDEA), vol. 27(3), pages 695-725, September.
    2. Renneboog, L.D.R. & Szilagyi, P.G., 2009. "Shareholder Activism through the Proxy Process," Other publications TiSEM cc25d736-2965-4511-b100-1, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    3. Peter Cziraki & Luc Renneboog & Peter G. Szilagyi, 2010. "Shareholder Activism through Proxy Proposals: The European Perspective," European Financial Management, European Financial Management Association, vol. 16(5), pages 738-777, November.
    4. Christof Beuselinck & Luc Desrousseaux, 2024. "Hedge fund activism and corporate intangible capital investments," Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, Springer, vol. 63(1), pages 37-61, July.
    5. Hadani, Michael & Goranova, Maria & Khan, Raihan, 2011. "Institutional investors, shareholder activism, and earnings management," Journal of Business Research, Elsevier, vol. 64(12), pages 1352-1360.
    6. Tristan Boyer & Elena Chane-Alune, 2008. "IFRS and the Need for Non-Financial Information," LSF Research Working Paper Series 08-06, Luxembourg School of Finance, University of Luxembourg.
    7. Jean-Sebastien Lantz & Sophie Montandrau & Jean-Michel Sahut, 2014. "Activism of Institutional Investors, Corporate Governance Alerts and Financial Performance," Working Papers 2014-353, Department of Research, Ipag Business School.
    8. Haigh, Matthew & de Graaf, Frank Jan, 2009. "The implications of reform-oriented investment for regulation and governance," CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES ON ACCOUNTING, Elsevier, vol. 20(3), pages 399-417.
    9. Adegbite, Emmanuel, 2015. "Good corporate governance in Nigeria: Antecedents, propositions and peculiarities," International Business Review, Elsevier, vol. 24(2), pages 319-330.
    10. Choi, Woon-Youl & Cho, Sung Hoon, 2003. "Shareholder activism in Korea: An analysis of PSPD's activities," Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, Elsevier, vol. 11(3), pages 349-363, July.
    11. Matsusaka, John G. & Ozbas, Oguzhan & Yi, Irene, 2017. "Why Do Managers Fight Shareholder Proposals? Evidence from SEC No-Action Letter Decisions," Working Papers 262, The University of Chicago Booth School of Business, George J. Stigler Center for the Study of the Economy and the State.
    12. Souha Bouaziz Siala & Anis Jarboui, 2019. "The moderating effect of audit quality on the relation between shareholder activism and earnings management: Evidence from France," Contemporary Economics, University of Economics and Human Sciences in Warsaw., vol. 13(1), March.
    13. Denes, Matthew R. & Karpoff, Jonathan M. & McWilliams, Victoria B., 2017. "Thirty years of shareholder activism: A survey of empirical research," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 44(C), pages 405-424.
    14. Carlos F. alves & Victor Mendes, 2005. "Institutional Investor Activism: Does the Portfolio Management Skill Matter?," FEP Working Papers 184, Universidade do Porto, Faculdade de Economia do Porto.
    15. Igor Filatotchev & Oksana Dotsenko, 2015. "Shareholder activism in the UK: types of activists, forms of activism, and their impact on a target’s performance," Journal of Management & Governance, Springer;Accademia Italiana di Economia Aziendale (AIDEA), vol. 19(1), pages 5-24, February.
    16. Nicola Cucari, 2019. "Determinants of say on pay vote: a configurational analysis," International Entrepreneurship and Management Journal, Springer, vol. 15(3), pages 837-856, September.
    17. Emmanuel Adegbite & Kenneth Amaeshi & Olufemi Amao, 2012. "The Politics of Shareholder Activism in Nigeria," Journal of Business Ethics, Springer, vol. 105(3), pages 389-402, February.
    18. Harris, Oneil & Madura, Jeff & Glegg, Charmaine, 2010. "Do managers make takeover financing decisions that circumvent more effective outside blockholders?," The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 50(2), pages 180-190, May.
    19. Jochen Hartmann & Matthias Pelster & Soenke Sievers, 2022. "Shareholder activism around the globe: Hedge funds vs. other professional investors," Working Papers Dissertations 98, Paderborn University, Faculty of Business Administration and Economics.
    20. Lars Nordén & Therese Strand, 2011. "Shareholder activism among portfolio managers: rational decisions or 15 minutes of fame?," Journal of Management & Governance, Springer;Accademia Italiana di Economia Aziendale (AIDEA), vol. 15(3), pages 375-391, August.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:wly:natres:v:28:y:2004:i:4:p:317-330. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Wiley Content Delivery (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://doi.org/10.1111/(ISSN)1477-8947 .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.