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Information‐Sharing Strategies Based on Trust Risks Under a Governmental Incentive Mechanism

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  • Xiao Fu
  • Shuxuan Niu
  • Guanghua Han

Abstract

Due to swift shifts in market demand and variable production capacities within the chip industry, trust risks between upstream and downstream entities can readily develop, leading to challenges in information sharing. To tackle this challenge, this paper develops a two‐level evolutionary game model between vehicle manufacturers and chip suppliers. It examines the effects of government rewards and penalties, trust risks, and spillover benefits from information sharing on the strategic decisions of both parties. Furthermore, the paper investigates system evolution strategies under three distinct government policies: forced, fair, and favored. The findings show that as trust risks escalate, both entities in the supply chain tend to withhold information due to concerns over losing their unique competitive advantages. However, enhancing spillover benefits through information sharing positively impacts the mitigation of trust risks. Numerical simulations demonstrate that while a government‐forced policy with increased penalties may boost information sharing in the short term, it proves less effective over the long term. Conversely, preferred rewards and subsidies under equitable policies can significantly boost one party's readiness to share information, thus enhancing cooperation between the two parties. The paper also offers countermeasures and recommendations. For instance, it suggests that upstream and downstream enterprises should not only foster mutual trust but also vigilantly track government policy directions to develop effective information‐sharing strategies. Furthermore, government industrial policies should fully consider the actual market conditions to alleviate trust risks between upstream and downstream entities and promote information sharing among enterprises.

Suggested Citation

  • Xiao Fu & Shuxuan Niu & Guanghua Han, 2025. "Information‐Sharing Strategies Based on Trust Risks Under a Governmental Incentive Mechanism," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 46(3), pages 1501-1519, April.
  • Handle: RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:46:y:2025:i:3:p:1501-1519
    DOI: 10.1002/mde.4442
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