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Government Subsidy Policies for Industrial Internet Adoption: A Tripartite Evolutionary Game Analysis

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  • Xiaoshuai Peng
  • Shiyi Wang
  • Cui Zhao

Abstract

Understanding interactions between government, platforms, and enterprises is key to developing the industrial internet ecosystem. This study constructs a tripartite evolutionary game model to analyze stakeholder interactions. We examine the equilibrium strategies of stakeholders and the asymptotic stabilities of equilibrium points through theoretical and simulation analyses. The results show that increasing the subsidy coefficient, transaction fee rates for high‐level services, and compensation for mismatches incentivize platforms to offer high‐level services. Enterprises are motivated to participate in platforms by raising joining profits and lowering transaction fees. For the government, adjusting the subsidy coefficient promotes industrial internet adoption while avoiding excessive subsidies.

Suggested Citation

  • Xiaoshuai Peng & Shiyi Wang & Cui Zhao, 2025. "Government Subsidy Policies for Industrial Internet Adoption: A Tripartite Evolutionary Game Analysis," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 46(2), pages 1392-1404, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:46:y:2025:i:2:p:1392-1404
    DOI: 10.1002/mde.4440
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