CEO industry tournament, investor attention, and company value

Based on the emerging capital market of China, this paper uses the data of Chinese listed companies to test the market value management behavior of CEOs under the incentive of industry tournaments. The empirical results show that the CEOs industry tournament improves the value of listed companies by attracting investor attention. In the test of the incentive mechanism of the industry tournament, we find that in the samples with lower industry mobility and state ownership and where the CEO is new, retiring, or a founder, the industry pay gap has a weaker incentive effect on the CEO. In the test of the CEOs' efforts to manage investor attention, this paper finds that CEOs are incentivized to disclose more financial and nonfinancial information, increase advertising spending, and hold more shareholder meetings. Discussed with other incentives, compensation incentives and equity incentives enhance the motivational role of industry championships for CEOs. This study explores in depth the possible impact of industry tournaments on CEO behavioral decisions and also provides a new perspective for corporate to manage investor attention. This provides important reference value for corporate CEO compensation, information disclosure supervision, and investor decision‐making.