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Selection of pricing tactics in a dual‐channel supply chain under demand information asymmetry

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  • Haining Sun
  • Jianhu Cai
  • Lishuang Jia
  • Xiaoqing Hu

Abstract

This paper explores the differences of three pricing tactics in the dual‐channel supply chain (SC) under demand information asymmetry. The manufacturer holds confidential demand information. According to the decision sequences, three pricing tactics are considered. Specifically, the corresponding signaling games based on the three pricing tactics are analyzed under no information sharing. The results show when the confidential information is shared, the first move of retail pricing brings the positive impact on the SC members. However, under demand information asymmetry, the first move of retail pricing may not always benefit the member based on the signaling games.

Suggested Citation

  • Haining Sun & Jianhu Cai & Lishuang Jia & Xiaoqing Hu, 2023. "Selection of pricing tactics in a dual‐channel supply chain under demand information asymmetry," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 44(8), pages 4651-4670, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:44:y:2023:i:8:p:4651-4670
    DOI: 10.1002/mde.3968
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