IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/wly/mgtdec/v44y2023i6p3724-3738.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Solar farm investment game model: A data‐driven case in Florida

Author

Listed:
  • Junhai Ma
  • Tiantong Xu

Abstract

The most effective approach to subsidizing power producers in order to bolster the penetration of renewable energy is continuously debated. To address this issue, this paper undertakes an in‐depth investigation into a solar farm investment problem, aiming at capturing the common interests and frictions among the government, the solar system developer, and the utility. In this paper, both static and dynamic game models are proposed with the consideration of the uncertainty of solar power generation. Before investing in a solar farm project, a potential solar farm investor takes into account of subsidy rate regulation for utilities enacted by the government, the panel price announced by the solar developer. In this study, we identified two thresholds of solar panel cost, which provide valuable insights for government policymakers when formulating an appropriate subsidy rate for the solar energy industry. Besides, a optimal policy for each stakeholder has been exposed. The finding from the dynamic model discloses the profound influence of various behaviors on the long‐term profitability of each stakeholder. Finally, based on the real‐world solar power data in Orlando, a case study is presented to expose a more tangible prospect for industrial application.

Suggested Citation

  • Junhai Ma & Tiantong Xu, 2023. "Solar farm investment game model: A data‐driven case in Florida," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 44(6), pages 3724-3738, September.
  • Handle: RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:44:y:2023:i:6:p:3724-3738
    DOI: 10.1002/mde.3904
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://doi.org/10.1002/mde.3904
    Download Restriction: no

    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1002/mde.3904?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:44:y:2023:i:6:p:3724-3738. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Wiley Content Delivery (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www3.interscience.wiley.com/cgi-bin/jhome/7976 .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.