IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/wly/mgtdec/v22y2001i1-3p5-15.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

The political economy of gambling regulation

Author

Listed:
  • Raymond D. Sauer

    (Clemson University, Clemson, SC, USA)

Abstract

This paper presents an interest group model of gambling regulation and applies it to major changes in the regulation of US gambling markets. Gambling markets are among the most restricted and politicized markets in the American economy, yet economists interested in the economics of regulation have paid them little attention. Applying the economic theory of regulation to gambling markets can lead to greater understanding of current public policy. In addition, this application may shed light on the discipline itself, as to its ability to explain recurrent fluctuations in the extent of regulatory intervention over long periods of time. Broadly speaking, the interest group model is consistent with changes in the extent of regulation, including the recent period of liberalization and consequent growth in gambling. Copyright © 2001 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Suggested Citation

  • Raymond D. Sauer, 2001. "The political economy of gambling regulation," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 22(1-3), pages 5-15.
    • Handle: RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:22:y:2001:i:1-3:p:5-15
    DOI: 10.1002/mde.996
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.996
    File Function: Link to full text; subscription required
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1002/mde.996?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Martin, Robert & Yandle, Bruce, 1990. "State Lotteries as Duopoly Transfer Mechanisms," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 64(3), pages 253-264, March.
    2. O'Sullivan,Arthur & Sexton,Terri A. & Sheffrin,Steven M., 2007. "Property Taxes and Tax Revolts," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521035996, September.
    3. John E. Filer & Donald L. Moak & Barry Uze, 1988. "Why Some States Adopt Lotteries and others Don'T," Public Finance Review, , vol. 16(3), pages 259-283, July.
    4. Easterlin, Richard A., 1976. "Population Change and Farm Settlement in the Northern United States," The Journal of Economic History, Cambridge University Press, vol. 36(1), pages 45-75, March.
    5. Gary S. Becker, 1983. "A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups for Political Influence," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 98(3), pages 371-400.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. repec:ces:ifodic:v:12:y:2014:i:3:p:19126467 is not listed on IDEAS
    2. Aidan Vining & Anthony Boardman, 2014. "Self-interest Springs Eternal: Political Economy Reasons why Public-Private Partnerships Do Not Work as Well as Expected," ifo DICE Report, ifo Institute - Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich, vol. 12(3), pages 17-23, October.
    3. Chang, Juin-Jen & Fiedler, Ingo & Lai, Ching-Chong & Wang, Ping, 2021. "Cross-border casino competition, Externalities and Optimal Tax Policy: A Unified Theory with Quantitative Analysis," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 88(C).
    4. Juin-Jen Chang & Ching-Chong Lai & Ping Wang, 2004. "On the Public Economics of Casino Gambling," IEAS Working Paper : academic research 04-A005, Institute of Economics, Academia Sinica, Taipei, Taiwan.
    5. Aidan Vining & Anthony Boardman, 2014. "Self-interest Springs Eternal: Political Economy Reasons why Public-Private Partnerships Do Not Work as Well as Expected," ifo DICE Report, ifo Institute - Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich, vol. 12(03), pages 17-23, October.
    6. Levi Perez, 2018. "Introduction - Gambling economics and management: some insights into recent developments in gambling-related research," Economics and Business Letters, Oviedo University Press, vol. 7(4), pages 126-128.
    7. David Paton & Donald S. Siegel & Leighton Vaughan Williams, 2002. "A Policy Response To The E--Commerce Revolution: The Case Of Betting Taxation In The UK," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 112(480), pages 296-314, June.
    8. Juin-Jen Chang & Ching-Chong Lai & Ping Wang, 2017. "A Tale of Two Cities: Cross-Border Casino Competition Between Detroit and Windsor," NBER Working Papers 23969, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    9. David Forrest, 2013. "An Economic And Social Review Of Gambling In Great Britain," Journal of Gambling Business and Economics, University of Buckingham Press, vol. 7(3), pages 1-33.
    10. Humphreys, Brad R. & Soebbing, Brian, 2012. "Sports betting, sports bettors and sports gambling policy," Edition HWWI: Chapters, in: Büch, Martin-Peter & Maennig, Wolfgang & Schulke, Hans-Jürgen (ed.), Sport und Sportgroßveranstaltungen in Europa - zwischen Zentralstaat und Regionen, volume 4, pages 15-37, Hamburg Institute of International Economics (HWWI).
    11. Juin‐Jen Chang & Ching‐Chong Lai & Ping Wang, 2010. "Casino regulations and economic welfare," Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 43(3), pages 1058-1085, August.
    12. Humphreys, Brad R. & Perez, Levi, 2012. "Who Bets on Sports? Characteristics of Sports Bettors and the Consequences of Expanding Sports Betting Opportunities/¿Quién apuesta? Características de los apostantes deportivos y consecuencias de la ," Estudios de Economia Aplicada, Estudios de Economia Aplicada, vol. 30, pages 579-598, Agosto.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Linda S. Ghent & Alan P. Grant, 2007. "Are Voting and Buying Behavior Consistent? Evidence from the South Carolina Education Lottery," Public Finance Review, , vol. 35(6), pages 669-688, November.
    2. Mark M. Glickman & Gary D. Painter, 2004. "Do Tax and Expenditure Limits Lead to State Lotteries? Evidence from the United States: 1970-1992," Public Finance Review, , vol. 32(1), pages 36-64, January.
    3. Persson, Torsten & Tabellini, Guido, 2002. "Political economics and public finance," Handbook of Public Economics, in: A. J. Auerbach & M. Feldstein (ed.), Handbook of Public Economics, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 24, pages 1549-1659, Elsevier.
    4. Anders Gustafsson, 2019. "Busy doing nothing: why politicians implement inefficient policies," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 30(3), pages 282-299, September.
    5. Bryan Caplan & Edward Stringham, 2005. "Mises, bastiat, public opinion, and public choice," Review of Political Economy, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 17(1), pages 79-105.
    6. Tin Cheuk Leung & Kwok Ping Ping & Kevin K. Tsui, 2019. "What can deregulators deregulate? The case of electricity," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 56(1), pages 1-32, August.
    7. Fu, Tong & Jian, Ze, 2020. "A developmental state: How to allocate electricity efficiently in a developing country," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 138(C).
    8. Rosenzweig, Mark R. & Wolpin, Kenneth I., 1984. "Externalities, Heterogeneity and the Optimal Distribution of Public Programs: Child Health and Family Planning Interventions," Bulletins 8435, University of Minnesota, Economic Development Center.
    9. Francis,David C. & Kubinec ,Robert, 2022. "Beyond Political Connections : A Measurement Model Approach to Estimating Firm-levelPolitical Influence in 41 Economies," Policy Research Working Paper Series 10119, The World Bank.
    10. Boone, Peter, 1996. "Politics and the effectiveness of foreign aid," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 40(2), pages 289-329, February.
    11. Grant H. Lewis, 2017. "Effects of federal socioeconomic contracting preferences," Small Business Economics, Springer, vol. 49(4), pages 763-783, December.
    12. Deniz Igan & Prachi Mishra & Thierry Tressel, 2012. "A Fistful of Dollars: Lobbying and the Financial Crisis," NBER Macroeconomics Annual, University of Chicago Press, vol. 26(1), pages 195-230.
    13. de Miguel-Arribas, A. & Morón-Vidal, J. & Floría, L.M. & Gracia-Lázaro, C. & Hernández, L. & Moreno, Y., 2024. "Contests in two fronts," Chaos, Solitons & Fractals, Elsevier, vol. 179(C).
    14. Vincent Smith & Justus H. H. Wesseler & David Zilberman, 2021. "New Plant Breeding Technologies: An Assessment of the Political Economy of the Regulatory Environment and Implications for Sustainability," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 13(7), pages 1-18, March.
    15. Beck, Thorsten & Demirguc-Kunt, Asli & Levine, Ross, 2006. "Bank supervision and corruption in lending," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 53(8), pages 2131-2163, November.
    16. Roberts, Donna & Orden, David, 1995. "Determinants of Technical Barriers to Trade: The Case of US Phytosanitary Restrictions on Mexican Avocados, 1972-1995," 1995: Understanding Technical Barriers to Agricultural Trade Conference, December 1995, Tucson, Arizona 50709, International Agricultural Trade Research Consortium.
    17. Knight, J.B. & Sabot, R.H., 1988. "Lewis Through A Looking Glass: Public Sector Employment, Rent-Seeking And Economic Growth," Center for Development Economics 108, Department of Economics, Williams College.
    18. John C. Beghin & William E. Foster & Mylene Kherallah, 1996. "Institutions And Market Distortions: International Evidence For Tobacco," Journal of Agricultural Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 47(1‐4), pages 355-365, January.
    19. Koichi Hamada & Asahi Noguchi, 2005. "The Role of Preconceived Ideas in Macroeconomic Policy: Japan's Experiences in the Two Deflationary Periods," Working Papers 908, Economic Growth Center, Yale University.
    20. Said-Nour Samake, 2022. "Prudential Regulation and Bank Efficiency : Evidence from WAEMU Zone," Working Papers hal-03540209, HAL.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:22:y:2001:i:1-3:p:5-15. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Wiley Content Delivery (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www3.interscience.wiley.com/cgi-bin/jhome/7976 .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.