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Corporate takeovers, bargaining and managers' incentives to invest

Author

Listed:
  • Marcel Canoy

    (Netherlands Central Planning Bureau, Van Stolkweg 14, The Hague, Netherlands)

  • Yohanes E. Riyanto

    (Center for Economic Studies, Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, Belgium)

  • Patrick Van Cayseele

    (Center for Economic Studies, Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, Belgium)

Abstract

This paper analyzes the impact of potential takeovers on the investment decisions of managers. The takeover involves bargaining over the potential surplus between the acquiring firm, the target manager, and shareholders of the target firm. The anticipation of future takeover gains will influence the decision-makers to invest ex ante. Interestingly, both over and underinvestment might prevail, depending on the relative bargaining powers of the parties. The model encompasses specific cases documented in the empirical literature and mergers and acquisitions (M&A) practice. It is, therefore, particularly suited to focus on the desirability of anti-takeover legislation. Copyright © 2000 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Suggested Citation

  • Marcel Canoy & Yohanes E. Riyanto & Patrick Van Cayseele, 2000. "Corporate takeovers, bargaining and managers' incentives to invest," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 21(1), pages 1-18.
    • Handle: RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:21:y:2000:i:1:p:1-18
    DOI: 10.1002/1099-1468(200001/02)21:1<1::AID-MDE961>3.0.CO;2-C
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Oliver Fabel & Martin Kolmar, 2007. "On 'Golden Parachutes' as Manager Discipline," TWI Research Paper Series 17, Thurgauer Wirtschaftsinstitut, Universität Konstanz.
    2. M. Pilar Socorro, 2009. "R&D investment as a signal in corporate takeovers," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 30(5), pages 335-350.
    3. Christos Cabolis & Constantine Manasakis & Emmanuel Petrakis, 2008. "Horizontal Mergers and Acquisitions with Endogenous Efficiency Gains," Working Papers 0817, University of Crete, Department of Economics.
    4. Fabel, Oliver & Kolmar, Martin, 2012. "Do parachutes discipline managers? An analysis of takeover battles," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 32(2), pages 224-232.
    5. Cabolis, C. & Manasakis, C., 2016. "R&D investments fostering horizontal mergers," UC3M Working papers. Economics 23280, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía.
    6. Fabel, Oliver & Kolmar, Martin, 2002. "Management takeover battles and the role of the golden handshake," Discussion Papers, Series I 319, University of Konstanz, Department of Economics.
    7. Pr. D. Patrick Van Cayseele, 2002. "Investment, R&D and liquidity constraints," Working Paper Research 33, National Bank of Belgium.

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