IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/wly/mgtdec/v19y1998i3p189-195.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Whom to license patented technology

Author

Listed:
  • Sang-Seung Yi

    (Department of Economics, Sogang University, Seoul, Korea)

Abstract

This paper examines the optimal licensing policy of a patent holder when potential licensees differ in their capacities in absorbing the patented technology. If two-part tariffs with non-negative royalties and fixed fees are feasible, the patent holder finds it optimal to license the strong firm exclusively whether or not an exclusive licensing of the weak firm deters the strong firm from entering the market. Hence, the potential trade-offs between strategic gains associated with licensing to weak competitors and efficiency gains associated with licensing to efficient competitors do not exist when two part tariffs are available. © 1998 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Suggested Citation

  • Sang-Seung Yi, 1998. "Whom to license patented technology," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 19(3), pages 189-195.
    • Handle: RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:19:y:1998:i:3:p:189-195
    DOI: 10.1002/(SICI)1099-1468(199805)19:3<189::AID-MDE879>3.0.CO;2-G
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    To our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
    1. Check below whether another version of this item is available online.
    2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
    3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Derek Clark & Øystein Foros & Jan Sand, 2011. "Foreclosure in contests," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 148(1), pages 215-232, July.
    2. Montez, João & Marxen, Annabelle, 2020. "Licensing at the patent cliff and market entry," CEPR Discussion Papers 14276, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    3. Vishwasrao, Sharmila, 2007. "Royalties vs. fees: How do firms pay for foreign technology?," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 25(4), pages 741-759, August.
    4. Salman Ali & Syed Mizanur Rahman, 2020. "R&D Expenditure in a Competitive Landscape: A Game Theoretic Approach," International Journal of Business and Economics, School of Management Development, Feng Chia University, Taichung, Taiwan, vol. 19(1), pages 47-60, June.
    5. Soo Jeoung Sohn, 2006. "Choosing the partners in the licensing alliance," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 27(4), pages 251-260.
    6. Pascale Crama & Bert De Reyck & Zeger Degraeve, 2008. "Milestone Payments or Royalties? Contract Design for R&D Licensing," Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 56(6), pages 1539-1552, December.
    7. Wang, Wei & Lyu, Gaoyan & Cui, Wei & Li, Yongjian, 2021. "Strategic technology commercialization in the supply chain under network effects," International Journal of Production Economics, Elsevier, vol. 231(C).

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:19:y:1998:i:3:p:189-195. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Wiley Content Delivery (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www3.interscience.wiley.com/cgi-bin/jhome/7976 .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.