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Facility siting and compensation: Lessons from the Massachusetts experience

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  • Michael O'Hare
  • Debra Sanderson

Abstract

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Suggested Citation

  • Michael O'Hare & Debra Sanderson, 1993. "Facility siting and compensation: Lessons from the Massachusetts experience," Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 12(2), pages 364-376.
  • Handle: RePEc:wly:jpamgt:v:12:y:1993:i:2:p:364-376
    DOI: 10.2307/3325241
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    Cited by:

    1. Lejano, Raul P. & Davos, Climis A., 2001. "Siting noxious facilities with victim compensation: : n-person games under transferable utility," Socio-Economic Planning Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 35(2), pages 109-124.
    2. Lejano, Raul P. & Davos, Climis A., 2002. "Fair Share: Siting Noxious Facilities as a Risk Distribution Game under Nontransferable Utility," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 43(2), pages 251-266, March.
    3. Kenneth A. Oye & James H. Maxwell, 1994. "8. Self-Interest and Environmental Management," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 6(4), pages 593-624, October.
    4. Livia Navone, 2013. "Property versus political holdouts: the case of the TGV rail line Lyon–Budapest in Italy," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 35(3), pages 409-426, June.
    5. Barak Richman & Chris Boerner, "undated". "A Transaction Cost Economizing Approach To Regulation: Understanding Government Responses To The Nimby Problem," American Law & Economics Association Annual Meetings 1010, American Law & Economics Association.

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