IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/wly/jintdv/v9y1997i4p497-505.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Conditionality When Donor And Recipient Preferences Vary

Author

Listed:
  • HOWARD WHITE

    (Institute of Social Studies, The Hague, The Netherlands)

  • OLIVER MORRISSEY

    (CREDIT and Department of Economics, University of Nottingham, UK)

Abstract

An extensive literature evaluates the content of conditionality, but the design of conditionality has received less attention. This paper presents a general framework of conditionality, which allows donor and recipient preferences for policy reform and aid to vary, in which previous contributions are incorporated as specific cases. The general approach allows for conditionality as bargaining between donors and recipients: cases where donors impose conditions on unwilling recipients; cases where recipients are willing but unable to implement all conditions; and situations where recipients and donors are clearly in conflict. Ex ante conditionality is shown to be ineffective in promoting reform in all cases and often counter-productive, either inhibiting the reform efforts of sincere governments or undermining its own credibility by encouraging donors to condone slippage. © 1997 by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Suggested Citation

  • Howard White & Oliver Morrissey, 1997. "Conditionality When Donor And Recipient Preferences Vary," Journal of International Development, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 9(4), pages 497-505.
    • Handle: RePEc:wly:jintdv:v:9:y:1997:i:4:p:497-505
    DOI: 10.1002/(SICI)1099-1328(199706)9:4<497::AID-JID459>3.0.CO;2-C
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    To our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
    1. Check below whether another version of this item is available online.
    2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
    3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Oliver Morrissey,, "undated". "Politics and Economic Policy Reform: Trade Liberalisation in Sub-Saharan Africa (Journal of International Development, 7:4, 1995, pp.599-618)," Discussion Papers 95/10, University of Nottingham, CREDIT.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Graham Bird, 2007. "The Imf: A Bird'S Eye View Of Its Role And Operations," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 21(4), pages 683-745, September.
    2. Oliver Morrissey, 2011. "Comment on Mosley (2010): Trust and conditionality, or can the World Bank Leopard change its spots," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 6(3), pages 453-456, September.
    3. Paul Clist & Alessia Isopi & Oliver Morrissey, 2012. "Selectivity on aid modality: Determinants of budget support from multilateral donors," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 7(3), pages 267-284, September.
    4. Michaelowa, Katharina, 2003. "The Political Economy of the Enhanced HIPC-Initiative," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 114(3-4), pages 461-476, March.
    5. Kanbur, Ravi, 2006. "The economics of international aid," Handbook on the Economics of Giving, Reciprocity and Altruism, in: S. Kolm & Jean Mercier Ythier (ed.), Handbook of the Economics of Giving, Altruism and Reciprocity, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 26, pages 1559-1588, Elsevier.
    6. Axel Dreher, 2009. "IMF conditionality: theory and evidence," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 141(1), pages 233-267, October.
    7. Kalonga Stambuli, 2002. "Political Change, Economic Transition and Catalysis of IMF and World Bank Models - the case of Malawi," Macroeconomics 0211003, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    8. Oliver Morrissey, 2002. "Recipient Governments' Willingness and Ability to Meet Aid Conditionality: The Effectiveness of Aid Finance and Conditions," WIDER Working Paper Series DP2002-105, World Institute for Development Economic Research (UNU-WIDER).
    9. Pablo Yanguas, 2014. "Leader, Protester, Enabler, Spoiler: Aid Strategies and Donor Politics in Institutional Assistance," Development Policy Review, Overseas Development Institute, vol. 32(3), pages 299-312, May.
    10. Stefan Koeberle & Harold Bedoya & Peter Silarszky & Gero Verheyen, 2005. "Conditionality Revisited : Concepts, Experiences, and Lessons," World Bank Publications - Books, The World Bank Group, number 7346.
    11. Mark McGillivray & Oliver Morrissey, 2000. "Aid fungibility in Assessing Aid: red herring or true concern?," Journal of International Development, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 12(3), pages 413-428, April.
    12. Pincin, Jared, 2012. "Foreign aid and political influence of the development assistance committee countries," MPRA Paper 39668, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    13. Elisabeth Paul, 2006. "A Survey of the Theoretical Economic Literature on Foreign Aid," Asian-Pacific Economic Literature, The Crawford School, The Australian National University, vol. 20(1), pages 1-17, May.
    14. Oliver Morrissey, 2004. "Conditionality and Aid Effectiveness Re‐evaluated," The World Economy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 27(2), pages 153-171, February.
    15. Mark McGillivray & Oliver Morrissey, 2001. "Fiscal Effects of Aid," WIDER Working Paper Series DP2001-61, World Institute for Development Economic Research (UNU-WIDER).
    16. Vaughn F. Graham, 2017. "Toward a Conceptual Expansion of Ownership and Post‐2015 Global Development Policy: Illustrations from the Jamaican Experience," Development Policy Review, Overseas Development Institute, vol. 35(3), pages 373-395, May.
    17. Paul Mosley, 2011. "RETRACTED ARTICLE: Trust and conditionality; Or, can the World Bank ‘Leopard’ change its spots?," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 6(3), pages 483-483, September.
    18. Oliver Morrissey, 2002. "Making Debt Relief Conditionality Pro-Poor," WIDER Working Paper Series DP2002-04, World Institute for Development Economic Research (UNU-WIDER).
    19. Abrams M E Tagem, 2017. "Analysing the determinants of health aid allocation in sub-Saharan Africa," Discussion Papers 2017-09, University of Nottingham, CREDIT.
    20. Hennessy, Jack & Mortimer, Duncan & Sweeney, Rohan & Woode, Maame Esi, 2023. "Donor versus recipient preferences for aid allocation: A systematic review of stated-preference studies," Social Science & Medicine, Elsevier, vol. 334(C).

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.

      More about this item

      Statistics

      Access and download statistics

      Corrections

      All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:wly:jintdv:v:9:y:1997:i:4:p:497-505. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

      If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

      If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

      If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

      For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Wiley Content Delivery (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www3.interscience.wiley.com/journal/5102/home .

      Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

      IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.