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How interest groups lobby to influence budget outcomes in Zambia

Author

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  • Samuel M. Bwalya
  • Ezekiel Phiri
  • Kelvin Mpembamoto

Abstract

This paper examines the nature of state–business relations and how interest groups utilise the budget process to lobby for tax and expenditure policies in Zambia, using information compiled from budget proposals interest groups submit towards the budget and lobbying activity data published in the daily newspapers between 2006 and 2008. The data shows a significant increase in interest groups formed especially in the civil society segmented and improvements in state–business relations, although not formalised and institutionalised, since political liberalisation in 1991. Analysis of lobbying data indicates that interest groups utilise the formal budget processes and informal policy networks such as the media to lobby unilaterally and collectively for favourable tax and expenditure policies. Tax proposals submitted through government departments had a greater chance of being adopted in the budget as bureaucrats assisted to shepherd them through the budget process. Copyright (C) 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Suggested Citation

  • Samuel M. Bwalya & Ezekiel Phiri & Kelvin Mpembamoto, 2011. "How interest groups lobby to influence budget outcomes in Zambia," Journal of International Development, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 23(3), pages 420-442, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:wly:jintdv:v:23:y:2011:i:3:p:420-442
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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/jid.1778
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    Cited by:

    1. Agustin Redonda, 2016. "Tax Expenditures and Sustainability. An Overview," Discussion Notes 1603, Council on Economic Policies.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    interest groups ; lobbying ; state–business relations ; budget process ; Zambia ; D72; H30 ;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • H30 - Public Economics - - Fiscal Policies and Behavior of Economic Agents - - - General

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