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Sequential Expert Advice: Superiority Of Closed‐Door Meetings

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  • Parimal K. Bag
  • Tridib Sharma

Abstract

Two career‐concerned experts sequentially give advice to a Bayesian decision maker (D). We find that secrecy dominates transparency, yielding superior decisions for D. Secrecy empowers the expert moving late to be pivotal more often. Further, (i) only secrecy enables the second expert to partially communicate her information and its high precision to D and swing the decision away from first expert's recommendation; (ii) if experts have high average precision, then the second expert is effective only under secrecy. These results are obtained when experts only recommend decisions. If they also report the quality of advice, fully revealing equilibrium may exist.

Suggested Citation

  • Parimal K. Bag & Tridib Sharma, 2019. "Sequential Expert Advice: Superiority Of Closed‐Door Meetings," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 60(4), pages 1877-1910, November.
    • Handle: RePEc:wly:iecrev:v:60:y:2019:i:4:p:1877-1910
    DOI: 10.1111/iere.12407
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