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Universalism And The Value Of Political Power

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  • Yumi Koh

Abstract

Although legislatures typically use majority rule to allocate a budget in distributive legislation, unanimous consent over the broad allocation of benefits is pervasive. I develop a game‐theoretic model where members strategically interact in a universal coalition to determine allocations, with noncooperative bargaining as a threat point for the breakdown of cooperation. To quantify the effects of political power on the agreed‐upon allocation, I structurally estimate the model using the “Bridge Bill Capital Budget” in 1992. I find that 16.73% of the budget would be allocated differently if allocations were determined only based on actual needs.

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  • Yumi Koh, 2018. "Universalism And The Value Of Political Power," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 59(3), pages 1375-1402, August.
    • Handle: RePEc:wly:iecrev:v:59:y:2018:i:3:p:1375-1402
    DOI: 10.1111/iere.12307
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    Cited by:

    1. Koh, Yumi & Lee, Gea M., 2020. "Infrastructure investment and travel time," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 187(C).

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